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We examine the impact on U.S. labor markets of offshore outsourcing in services to China and India.
 We also consider the reverse flow or 'inshoring' which is the sale of services produced in the United
States to unaffiliated buyers in China and India.  Using March-to-March matched CPS data for 1996-2006
we examine the impacts on (1) occupation and industry switching, (2) weeks spent unemployed as
a share of weeks in the labor force, and (3) earnings.  We precisely estimate small positive effects
of inshoring and smaller negative effects of offshore outsourcing.  The net effect is positive.  
To illustrate how small the effects are, suppose that over the next nine years all of inshoring and offshore
outsourcing grew at rates experienced during 1996-2005 in business, professional and technical services
i.e., in segments where China and India have been particularly strong.  Then workers in occupations
that are exposed to inshoring and offshore outsourcing (1) would switch 4-digit occupations 2 percent
less often, (2) would spend 0.1 percent less time unemployed, and (3) would earn 1.5 percent more.
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dtrefler@rotman.utoronto.caBeginning in the mid-1990s, cumulative improvements in information and communications 
technologies (ICT) facilitated a dramatic expansion of international trade in services.  The 
interaction of these improvements with a politically driven increase in the outward orientation of 
China and India has had two major consequences for the pattern of world trade.  First, educated 
U.S. workers are competing for the first time ever with educated but low-paid foreign workers.  
Second, the most entrepreneurial of these educated workers are providing key inputs into the 
final product so that, as in Antrás (2003) and Antrás and Helpman (2004), these inputs are 
provided in outsourcing relationships rather than within multinationals.  In short, educated 
American workers are now facing intense competition from the offshore outsourcing of services 
to China and India. 
This development has captured just about everyone’s attention.  Samuelson (2004) and 
Blinder (2005) have emphasized its potential dangers while Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan 
(2004) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have pointed to its potential benefits.  The U.S. 
Senate has taken a dim view of those who speak out against the mounting jobs hysteria (e.g., 
Mankiw and Swagel, 2006) while international organizations have taken a more balanced view 
of the costs and benefits (e.g., UNCTAD, 2004; OECD, 2006).  Even management consultants 
have been in on the act, seeing the potential to attract business through either over-blown claims 
(e.g., Forrester Research, 2002) or considered opinion (e.g., Baily and Farrell, 2004).  Yet to date 
there has not been a multivariate econometric assessment of the impact of offshore outsourcing 
on educated, white-collar U.S. workers.  We know nothing about what offshore outsourcing of 
services to China and India has meant for the incidence of industry and occupation switching, for 
weeks spent unemployed, or for education- and experience-adjusted earnings.  
There is, of course, a large related literature on offshore outsourcing spawned by the seminal   2
work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999).  Much of this literature is concerned with inequality 
and the relative demand for skills.  See Verhoogen (2008) for a recent contribution.  See also 
Amiti and Wei (2005a, 2005b, 2006a) for related work on employment and productivity.  The 
closest paper to ours is Amiti and Wei (2006b).  They regress changes in industry-level U.S. 
manufacturing employment over the 1992-2000 period on Feenstra-Hanson measures of 
outsourcing and find modest employment impacts.  We depart from the few existing econometric 
studies in several ways. 
First, we focus only on services, only on offshore outsourcing and only on low-wage trading 
partners.  Most of the literature deals with manufacturing and works with the sum of offshore 
outsourcing and foreign direct investment.  The literature also usually looks at all trade rather 
than just trade with low-wage countries, though see Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) and Liu 
(2007) for exceptions.  Offshore outsourcing of services to low-wage countries is where the 
debate has been most intense and where the econometric analysis has been all but absent.  The 
international trade data we use are international service transactions between unaffiliated parties 
for the period 1995-2005.  The data are produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).   
Second, we examine the flip side of offshore outsourcing, namely, the sale of services 
produced in the United States to unaffiliated parties in low-wage countries.  For brevity we refer 
to this as ‘inshoring.’
1  It is inappropriate to look only at the costs of offshore outsourcing to low-
wage countries without at the same time looking at the benefits of inshoring to these countries.  
Third, we work with March-to-March matched Current Population Survey (CPS) data for 
1996-2006.  This allows us to control for worker characteristics and exploit longitudinal 
evidence.  Our strategy of combining matched CPS data with trade data has been influenced by 
                                                 
1 Slaughter (2004) coined the term “insourcing” to refer to foreign direct investment rather than outsourcing. We are 
unabashedly stealing his term.    3
Goldberg and Tracy’s (2003) excellent work on the effect of exchange rates on wages and job 
switching.  It is the only study we know of that uses matched CPS data to study an international 
trade issue.  We examine four worker outcomes: (1) industry switching, (2) occupation switching, 
(3) annual changes in weeks spent unemployed as a share of total weeks in the labor force (as in 
Murphy and Topel, 1987), and (4) changes in earnings. 
Turning to our results, we precisely estimate either small negative effects or zero effects of 
offshore outsourcing on all four outcomes.  We also precisely estimate small positive effects or 
zero effects of inshoring on each of these outcomes.  The positive inshoring effects are either as 
large as or larger than the negative offshore outsourcing effects so that the net effect is either 
slightly positive or zero.  Since the small effects are precisely estimated we can say with 
confidence that even if service trade with China and India grows at its current clip, the labor-
market implications will be small.  In short, we find that the labor-market consequences of 
inshoring and offshore outsourcing of services to China and India are, to quote the Bard, much 
ado about nothing. 
The remainder of this introduction reviews additional aspects of the related literature.  The 
observation that there has been almost no econometric research on the effect of inshoring and 
offshore outsourcing on our four outcomes should not be misconstrued to mean that there has 
been no research at all.  Much of the existing research is primarily concerned with counting the 
number of U.S. workers who are in industries or occupations that are exposed to inshoring and 
offshore outsourcing in services.  This is done by concording the classification systems used to 
record international trade in services with various industry and occupation classification systems 
used to record employment data.  See Bardhan and Kroll (2003), Garner (2004), Kirkegaard 
(2004), Blinder (2005), van Welsum and Vickery (2005), and van Welsum and Reif (2006a,   4
2006b, 2006c, 2006d).  We use the by-now standard concordance that comes out of these studies 
to link international trade data with CPS data.   
Jensen and Kletzer (2005) provide a very different and novel way of thinking about exposure 
to international service trade.  If U.S. production of a service is concentrated geographically 
within the United States then it must be that the service is traded across regions within the United 
States.  Jensen and Kletzer argue that it must therefore be tradable internationally.  Using this 
insight, they find that about 28 percent of employment is in tradable occupations.  This estimate 
is very similar to our own estimate of 24 percent. 
This paper is related to two strands of research.  Research on worker mobility has found that 
human capital is partly specific to industries and occupations e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde and 
Sullivan (1993), Neal (1995), and Kambourov and Manovskii (forthcoming).  This implies that 
human capital will be destroyed by industry and occupation switching that is induced by offshore 
outsourcing.  Thus, estimates of the impact of service offshore outsourcing on industry and 
occupation switching is important for the design of policy.  There is also an emerging literature 
on the effect of trade openness on individual income volatility.  See McLaren and Newman 
(2002), Krabs, Krishna and Maloney (2005) and Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson (2007).  We do 
not examine income volatility though our work has implications for it. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 reviews the trends in outsourced international 
service trade.  Section 2 describes our March-to-March CPS matching and the concordance 
between the BEA international service trade classification and the CPS industry and occupation 
classifications.  Section 3 describes the key variables.  Section 4 provides a simple difference-in-
difference analysis of the impacts of inshoring and offshore outsourcing.  Sections 5-7 present 
the main econometric results.  Section 8 provides a lengthy sensitivity analysis that is entirely   5
responsible for the unusual length of the paper.  The less interested reader who skips section 8 
will find this paper to be of average length.  Section 9 concludes. 
 
1.  U.S. International Trade in Services: Inshoring and Offshore Outsourcing 
We are interested in the labor-market impacts of the offshore outsourcing of services.  The usual 
data used in studies of service-trade impacts do not distinguish between (1) offshore outsourcing 
– which is an arm’s length transaction between unaffiliated parties and (2) offshoring –which is 
the sum of affiliated-party and unaffiliated-party trade.
 2  See the state-of-the-art studies by Amiti 
and Wei (2006b) and van Welsum and Reif (2006d).  See also Trefler (2005, forthcoming) and 
Helpman and Trefler (2006).  Service trade data originate from balance-of-payments surveys.  
To isolate offshore outsourcing in services we use BEA data on international service transactions 
between unaffiliated parties.  See Borga and Mann (2004) for details of the BEA database.  As is 
standard in the offshoring literature, we only consider the BEA category ‘other private services.’  
It is defined as total private-sector services less transportation services, royalties and license fees.  
We will henceforth reserve the term offshore outsourcing for international transactions involving 
the sale of a foreign-produced service to an unaffiliated U.S. party.  Likewise, we will reserve the 
term inshoring for international transactions involving the sale of a U.S.-produced service to an 
unaffiliated foreign party.
3 
We use trade data for the period 1996-2005 or, when using lags, for 1995-2004.  1995 and 
                                                 
2 Two parties are unaffiliated if neither has a controlling interest in the other. 
3 It would have been interesting to complement our analysis with a parallel analysis of affiliated-party service trade 
or even total service trade.  Unfortunately, the BEA does not report this information by detailed country and type of 
service. On the other hand, there have been a number of studies of affiliated-party trade.  Harrison and McMillan 
(2006) provide a thorough examination of the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs by U.S. multinationals. They find 
that job creation in affiliates located in low-income (high-income) countries substitutes for (complements) job 
creation in U.S.-based plants.  Using service-sector data, Feinberg and Keane (2006) find that fast-growing U.S. 
multinationals tend to expand employment everywhere whereas slow-growing U.S. multinationals tend to contract 
employment everywhere.   6
1996 are convenient starting dates because inshoring and offshore outsourcing with China and 
India were at low levels until then.  (Recall that offshore outsourcing of services to India came to 
prominence during the Y2K scare of the late 1990s.)  Given the familiar difficulties of 
disentangling Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong trade (Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo, 
2005), we include Hong Kong in our Chinese trade data.
4    See appendix 1 for additional data 
details. 
Table 1 provides some basic statistics on inshoring and offshore outsourcing.  The largest 
category of U.S. inshoring is business, professional, and technical (BPT) services.  This includes 
ICT services (e.g., call centers and software development) as well as various legal, engineering, 
management consulting, R&D and advertising services.  Column 1 reports the dollar value of 
these U.S. exports (inshoring) in 2005.  Columns 2-4 report the average annual log change in 
inshoring over the 1996-2005 period for the world, China plus India, and the G8.
5  Columns 7-9 
report the corresponding growth rates of offshore outsourcing.  China and India’s inshoring and 
offshore outsourcing have been growing at 0.11 and 0.02 log points per year, respectively.  See 
the last row of columns 3 and 8.  The slow 0.02 growth of offshore outsourcing will come as a 
surprise. It is due to declines in telecommunications, China and India’s largest offshore 
outsourcing segment. These declines may be reversed if China’s version of third-generation 
wireless telecommunication standards (TD-SCDMA) is adopted in the future.  When attention is 
focused exclusively on computer and information services, the growth rate of offshore 
outsourcing rises to a remarkable 0.39 log points a year.   
There are two notable numbers in the table that will be used repeatedly below.  For Chinese 
                                                 
4 In the robustness section we include all low-wage countries for which bilateral data are available and find that this 
does not alter our results.  This is to be expected given China and India’s dominance. 
5 The G8 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. We exclude the United States 
(the exporter) and Russia (hardly a rich economy) from the G8.   7
and Indian activities with the highest profile (BPT Services), the growth rates are 0.14 for 
inshoring and 0.16 for offshore outsourcing.  These growth rates will be used for the ‘rapid-
growth effect’ described below. 
Since cross-industry variation in growth rates for China and India documented in columns 3 
and 8 are one of the sources of sample variation exploited in our regression analysis, it is useful 
to be reminded of their causes.  First, ICT-related technological change has been more relevant 
for some industries (such as computer and information services) than others (such as advertising).  
Second, for political economy reasons entirely exogenous to the U.S. labor market, China and 
India began liberalizing their economies in the early 1990s.
6  These exogenous liberalizations 
provided U.S. firms with access to skilled but low-paid workers from China and India and this 
access had greater cost implications for some industries (such as call centers) than for others 
(such as R&D).  The liberalization also exogenously provided U.S. firms with access to a 
growing market that was in desperate need of some but not all U.S. services e.g., banking and 
insurance.  It is helpful to separate out these two sources of cross-industry variation because 
much of the discussion about offshore outsourcing has been focused not on its general, ICT-
enabled rise with all countries, but on its specific rise with China and India. 
Table 1 allows one to partially disentangle the first source of variation (the pure ICT effect) 
from the second source (the interaction of ICT with exogenous liberalizations).  Columns 4 and 9 
of the table document the growth rates of inshoring and offshore outsourcing for the G8.  This 
G8 growth was driven by ICT developments and had nothing to do with Chinese and Indian 
liberalizations.  Indeed, the China-India growth rates in column 3 are not that correlated with the 
G8 growth rates in column 4.  The correlation is only 0.43.  Column 5 looks at the difference 
                                                 
6 In China, market reforms accelerated in 1992 as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s famous Southern Tour. In India, 
market reforms started in July 1991 as a result of a severe balance of payments crisis.   8
between columns 3 and 4. It shows that there have been large differences between the G8 and 
China-India in inshoring growth rates.  This suggests that a substantial portion of the cross-
industry variation in growth rates for China and India had less to do with a pure ICT effect and 
more to do with how ICT interacted with Chinese and Indian economic liberalizations.  As a 
result, in our regression analysis we will use G8 trade data in various ways as a control and/or 
instrument for the pure effects of ICT-related technological change. 
 
2.  CPS Data and its Link to Trade Data 
We match individuals across consecutive March CPS surveys from 1996 to 2006 in order to 
extract longitudinal information about work histories.
7   We start the matching procedure by 
extracting the subsample of all civilian adults who were surveyed in March of some year t.  We 
then apply Madrian and Lefgren’s (2000) two-stage matching algorithm to find a match in the 
March survey of year t +1.  In the first or ‘naïve’ stage, individuals are matched based on three 
variables: a household identifier, a household number, and an individual line number within a 
household.  If all three variables are the same in two consecutive March surveys then a naïve 
match is made.  In the second stage, a naïve match is discarded if it fails the S|R|A merge 
criterion i.e., if in the two consecutive March surveys the individual’s sex changes, the 
individual’s race changes, or the individual’s age changes inappropriately.
8  The naïve and final 
match rates for each year appear in appendix table A.1.  Averaging across all years, the naïve 
match rate is 67 percent, the S|R|A discard rate is 5 percent, and the final match rate is 64 percent 
(0.67×0.95 = 0.64).  Note that for 2001-2006 we also discard oversamples in the State Children 
                                                 
7 For international trade economists who are not familiar with the CPS, the most important thing to understand here 
about the structure of the CPS is that, very roughly speaking, an individual is surveyed in March of two consecutive 
years and then dropped from the CPS. We track (or match) individuals across the two consecutive years.   
8 Following Madrian and Lefgren (2000), an inappropriate age change is less than –1 or more than 3.  See Madrian 
and Lefgren (2000) for more detailed information about the matching algorithm.   9
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) extended sample files.  Our final match rate is similar to the 
rates of 62 percent in Goldberg and Tracy (2003) and 67 percent in Madrian and Lefgren (2000). 
Since the actual match rate is lower than the match rate of 100 percent that would obtain in 
the absence of mortality, migration, non-response and recording errors, there is obviously a 
selection issue associated with using matched CPS data.  Neumark and Kawaguchi (2004) partly 
dispel this selection concern by comparing the estimation results based on matched CPS data to 
results based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) which follows 
individuals who move.  However, as a precaution, in section 8.3 we model selection as a probit 
and simultaneously estimate the selection equation together with our labor-market outcome 
regressions.  While we cannot reject selection bias, the coefficients we care about are virtually 
the same as in OLS specifications. 
Each worker in the CPS sample is linked to a trade flow via the worker’s occupation and 
industry of affiliation.  We thus need two concordances.  One maps the trade categories in table 1 
into the Census industry classification.  The other maps the table 1 trade categories into the 
Census  occupation classification.  For example, consider a programmer who works for an 
insurance company.  Demand for her services will depend on demand in the insurance industry 
(the industry link) and on the demand for computer programmers (the occupation link). 
The linking of service-trade data to industries and occupations is now commonplace in the 
offshore outsourcing literature e.g., Bardhan and Kroll (2003), Garner (2004), Blinder (2005), 
Jensen and Kletzer (2005), Kirkegaard (2005), Mann (2005), van Welsum and Vickery (2005) 
and van Welsum and Reif (2006b).  For the sake of non-trade economists we emphasize that we 
are not breaking new ground here.  Appendix tables A.2 and A.3 present our mapping from the 
table 1 trade categories into industries and occupations, respectively.  The mappings are very   10
similar to those reported elsewhere e.g., van Welsum and Vickery (2005) and van Welsum and 
Reif (2006b).
9 
Our CPS sample of matched workers consists of 158,291 private workers aged 18-64.  37,550 
of these workers or 24 percent are in occupations that map into service-trade categories.   
Following the extensive literature cited above, we say that these workers are in occupations that 
are exposed to inshoring and offshore outsourcing and refer to them as the occupation-exposed 
sample.  24,261 of our 158,291 workers, or 15 percent, are in industries that map into the table 1 
service-trade categories i.e., that are exposed to inshoring and offshore outsourcing.  We refer to 
these 24,261 workers as the industry-exposed sample.  These two samples will be important for 
what follows.  Note that there is overlap between them:  15,183 workers are in both samples.  
 
3.  Variable Definitions 
Summary statistics for the occupation-exposed sample are presented in table 2. The 
corresponding statistics for the industry-exposed sample appear in appendix table A.4.  We will 
go through the statistics in detail in order to ensure that the definition of key variables is properly 
understood.  Since each worker appears in two consecutive March surveys we will use t to 
denote the year of the first March survey.  t  is what appears in the ‘Year’ column of table 2.  
Industry and Occupation Switching:  In both March surveys the worker is asked about her 
occupation in the longest job held last year (t – 1 or t).  A worker is a 4-digit occupation switcher 
if she worked in both years and had different occupations in years t – 1  and t .  This raw 
switching rate is notoriously noisy.  We thus filter it as suggested by Moscarini and Thomsson 
                                                 
9 Welsum is the lead OECD researcher on this topic.   11
(2006).  To be a valid switch, the worker must also have (1) changed her class
10 or (2) looked for 
a job last year or (3) switched industries.
11  See appendix 2 for details.  The generalization to 1- 
and 2- digit switching and to industry switching is immediate.   
Consider column 1 of table 2.  It reports 4-digit occupation switching rates for the occupation-
exposed sample.  For example, the 1996 row reports that 28 percent of workers switched 4-digit 
occupations between 1995 and 1996.  From the bottom panel of the table, switching rates 
averaged across all years fall to 0.20 at the 2-digit level and 0.17 at the 1-digit level.
12 
Our occupation switching rates at the 1- and 2-digit levels are similar to those in Kambourov 
and Manovskii (2008) who use 1996 PSID data.  They report switching rates of 0.18 at the 2-
digit level and 0.16 at the 1-digit level.  We cannot compare our 4-digit rates to anything in their 
work because they use older 3-digit 1970 Census codes while we use 4-digit 2002 Census codes.  
However, our 4-digit rate of 0.28 is significantly higher than their 3-digit rate of 0.22.  Our 
higher 4-digit rate may have to do with differences between the 1970 and 2002 Census codes. 
The latter introduced new occupations and industries and also coded existing occupations and 
industries more finely (especially in services). Thus, there does not appear to be major 
unexplained differences between our switching rates and those in the more careful, PSID-based 
study by Kambourov and Manovskii.  Finally, while switching rates calculated from the CPS are 
notoriously too high it is essential to remember that we are not interested in switching levels per 
se.  We will be using occupation switching rates in a regression framework with occupation and 
year fixed effects.  Thus, what is potentially problematic for us is the possibility that occupation 
miscoding varies systematically with inshoring and offshore outsourcing even after controlling 
                                                 
10 There are three classes of workers: (i) private, which includes working in a private for-profit company or being 
self-employed and incorporated; (ii) self-employed but not incorporated; and (iii) government employee. 
11 Our results are the same with or without the inclusion of this ‘switch-industry’ filter. 
12 The upward blip in 2002 results from the reclassification of Census industry and occupation codes that was 
introduced in 2003.  All of our results survive the deletion of 2002 from the sample.   12
for occupation and year fixed effects.  There is little reason to expect such systematic miscoding.   
Thus, CPS occupation miscoding does not appear to be a major issue in our context.  The same 
holds for industry switching.
13 
Change in Unemployment:  Change in unemployment is defined as the change in the 
number of weeks unemployed as a proportion of total labor force weeks.  This definition of 
unemployment is based on retrospective information from the March CPS and was suggested by 
Murphy and Topel (1987).  Changes in the proportion of labor force weeks spent unemployed 
appear in column 4 of table 2.   
Change in Annual Earnings:  Annual earnings are defined as CPI-deflated annual income 
from wages and salaries.  Means for this variable appear in column 7 of table 2. 
Worker Characteristic Controls:  In the regression analysis we will be including the usual 
controls for worker characteristics.  Sample means for these controls appear in appendix table 
A.5.  Experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.  We classify educational 
attainment into four groups: (1) high-school drop-outs, (2) high-school graduates, (3) college 
dropouts and (4) college graduates.
14  Over half of both samples are college graduates.  We refer 
collectively to groups (1)-(3) as non-college graduates.  We also classify workers into four skill 
groups: (1) unskilled blue collar, (2) skilled blue collar, (3) less-skilled white collar and (4) 
skilled white collar.  These groups are defined in appendix 3.  As shown in appendix table A.5, 
over 95 percent of our occupation- and industry-exposed samples are white-collar workers.  The 
remaining demographic variables in table A.5 are self-explanatory. 
 
                                                 
13 We are indebted to Gueorgui Kambourov for help with defining occupational switching. 
14  A college graduate has one of the following: a degree from college or occupational/vocational program; an 
associate degree from college or academic program; a bachelor's degree; a master’s degree, a professional school 
degree, or a doctoral degree.   13
4.  A Simple Difference-of-Difference Analysis 
Before presenting our regression-based estimates of the impact of inshoring and offshore 
outsourcing, we begin with a simple difference-in-differences analysis.
15  We compare the labor 
market outcomes of service workers who were exposed to inshoring and offshore outsourcing to 
those who were not.  Then we examine whether the difference between the two groups grew over 
time as inshoring and offshore outsourcing intensified.  In particular, we start with the 115,090 
matched workers in private service occupations (Census major occupation codes 1-5) and divide 
this group into those in our occupation-exposed sample (37,550 workers) and the remainder 
(77,540 workers).   
Consider the results for occupation switching in column 2 of table 2.  Positive numbers 
indicate that occupation switching was higher for the exposed sample than for the unexposed 
sample. However, the differences are not statistically significant (column 3).  Further, there is no 
upward trend over time in column 2.  That is, exposed workers did not switch more relative to 
unexposed workers as inshoring and offshoring intensified.
16 
Turning to the share of labor force weeks spent unemployed, column 5 of table 2 shows that 
the occupation-exposed sample spent more time unemployed than did the unexposed sample.  
However, the exposed-unexposed difference is not significant and did not increase over time.  
The table therefore provides no support for the claim that exposure to inshoring and offshore 
outsourcing raised the share of weeks in the labor force spent unemployed.   
In contrast, table 2 does provide evidence that exposure has lead to lower earnings.  From 
column 8, earnings changes were smaller for the exposed sample than for the unexposed sample 
                                                 
15 We are grateful to Thomas Lemieux for this and many other suggestions. 
16 Appendix table A.4 provides the corresponding results for industry switching in the industry-exposed sample.  For 
the industry-exposed sample we start with the 78,586 matched workers in private service industries (Census major 
industry codes 7-12) and divide this group into those in our industry-exposed sample (24,261 workers) and the 
remainder (54,325 workers).   14
and this difference has become more pronounced over time.  We will see below that this result is 
driven by occupation switchers.  
Section 8.4 revisits this analysis in a regression setting with full controls and finds that none 
of the table 2 double differences (exposed versus unexposed and 1996-2000 versus 2001-2005) 
is statistically significant.  
The above analysis is more sophisticated than what has appeared in the recent literature on 
offshore outsourcing.  Nevertheless, by academic standards it is too simplistic.  First, it does not 
control for differences in worker characteristics between the exposed and unexposed samples.  
Appendix table A.5 shows that differences in worker characteristics are important.  For example, 
exposed workers are more likely to be college graduates, skilled white-collar workers, married, 
male, and white.  Second, the above analysis does not control for differences in the degree of 
exposure: some of the exposed industries have been hard hit while others have been only slightly 
affected.  Third, it does not and can not distinguish between offshore outsourcing from low-wage 
versus high-wage countries. To deal with these issues we turn to a regression framework. 
 
5.  An Econometric Analysis of Switching 
5.1.  The Econometric Specification 
We begin with some notation.  Individual i first appears in the sample in March of year t(i) and 
then appears for the second and last time in March of year t(i) + 1.  Let j(i) and o(i) be i’s 4-digit 
industry and occupation, respectively, in the longest job held last year i.e., in t(i) – 1.  We will 
work with both industry and occupation switching.  However, consider industry switching first 
for the sake of concreteness.  Let Industry_Switchi,t(i) be a binary indicator equal to 1 if  i’s 4-
digit industry of affiliation changes between the longest jobs held in t(i) – 1 and t(i).  Let   15
CI
i t i j M 1 ) ( ), ( −  be U.S. offshore outsourcing to China and India in service industry j(i) in calendar 
year t(i) – 1.  Correspondingly, let 
CI
i t i j X 1 ) ( ), ( −  be U.S. inshoring from China and India.
17  Let r(i) 
be i’s state of residence in March of year t(i).  We estimate a probit of the determinants of 
switching: 
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where  Φ   is the normal cumulative distribution function,  () ji λ  and  () oi λ   are industry and 
occupation fixed effects,  () ti λ  is a year fixed effect and  ) (i r λ  is a state fixed effect.  Wi,t(i) is a 
vector of worker characteristics.
18   Note that we are not using a panel:  each observation 
corresponds to a different individual.  In what follows we will drop the i arguments of  j(i), o(i), 
t(i) and r(i).  Our focus variables are  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  and  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X − .
19 
20 
An immediate question about the specification is whether inshoring and offshore outsourcing 
should be entered in levels as we have done or in annual log changes.  With annual log changes 
the sample variation is, somewhat surprisingly, greatest in industries that had consistently low 
levels of inshoring and offshore outsourcing.  This is because small industries tend to have 
highly variable annual growth rates.  For example, the level of offshore outsourcing to China and 
                                                 
17 Restated,  CI
i t i j M 1 ) ( ), ( −   is unaffiliated-party U.S. imports of service j(i) from China and India and  CI
i t i j X 1 ) ( ), ( −  is 
unaffiliated-party U.S. exports of service j(i) to China and India. 
18 These are years of experience, experience squared, years of schooling, as well as dummies for sex, race, marital 
status and veteran status. 
19 The trade data are for the calendar year t – 1 while switching occurs sometime during the calendar years t – 1 and t.  
It would also make sense to use trade data for the calendar year t.  This is done in section 8.6 where it is shown to 
slightly improve the precision of our estimates. 
20 While we report probit results, logit results are very similar.   16
India in the construction-architecture-engineering category is tiny, yet the category had huge 
annual log changes of between –1.57 and 2.08.  Since the sample variation in annual log changes 
is greatest in industries where levels of inshoring and offshore outsourcing are low, it is not 
surprising that annual log changes in inshoring and offshore outsourcing are not significant in 
our switching probits. 
The specification in equation (1) – log levels of inshoring and offshore outsourcing together 
with fixed effects – exploits a very different source of sample variation than does annual changes.  
An industry that experiences sustained inshoring growth has many years for which inshoring is 
first well below and then well above the mean level for the industry.  Restated, deviations of log 
levels around the fixed effect are large.  The sample variation exploited in equation (1) is 
therefore driven by sustained growth of inshoring and offshore outsourcing.  It is this sustained 
growth that is most likely to have influenced employer decisions about hiring, firing, and pay 
and employee decisions about switching. 
The usefulness of a specification with log levels and fixed effects stems, then, from the fact 
that inshoring and offshore outsourcing have been in a prolonged period of sustained growth.  
Recall that in 1996 there was very little inshoring or offshore outsourcing with China and India.  
India gained prominence only in the late 1990s when it established itself as a home to cheap 
programmers who could solve Y2K bugs.  Offshore outsourcing of services was not viewed as 
an essential business practice until the time of the tech bubble.  See the counts of media reports 
in Amiti and Wei (2005a).  Thus, the big-picture source of sample variation has been the steady 
rise of inshoring and offshore outsourcing since 1996, not its annual fluctuations.  Our equation 
(1) specification exploits this big-picture sample variation. 
   17
5.2.  Basic Results 
The top panel of table 3 reports the probit estimates of equation (1).  For all the probits in this 
paper, we report marginal probabilities rather than slope coefficients e.g., we report 
,1 ln( )
CI
jt M − ∂Φ ∂  rather than β.  Consider column 1.  It reports the marginal probabilities for the 
impact of  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  and  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X −  on industry switching for the industry-exposed sample.  A 
one log point increase in  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  raises the probability of switching by 0.025.  Most of the 
public debate has centered on this offshore outsourcing effect. The often overlooked 
phenomenon is inshoring i.e.,  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X − .  Its marginal probability is –0.031 which indicates that 
a one log point increase in inshoring reduces the probability of industry switching by 0.031.  
Before discussing coefficient magnitudes there are a few other features of the table that should 
be explained.  First, coefficients on Wi in equation (1) do not appear in the table, but are reported 
in appendix table A.6.  Second, we do not report the equation (1) fixed effects.  Third, since we 
are examining the effects of industry-level variables on individuals, the standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level. 
Column 2 of table 7 reports the marginal probabilities of 4-digit occupation switching.  It 
differs from column 1 in two subtle but important ways.  First, the sample has changed from the 
industry-exposed sample to the occupation-exposed sample.  Second, the trade data are no longer 
mapped into Census industries.  Instead, they are mapped into Census occupations.  (Recall that 
appendix tables A.3 and A.4 report the mappings from the BEA’s international trade 
classification into Census industries and occupations, respectively.) 
The remaining columns re-estimate the probits for sub-populations i.e., for college graduates, 
for all workers excluding college graduates (non-college graduates), for skilled white-collar 
workers and for less-skilled white-collar workers.  For each of these, a column heading of ‘Ind.’   18
means industry switching estimated using the industry-exposed sample and industry-level trade 
flows.  A column heading of ‘Occ.’ means occupation switching estimated using the occupation-
exposed sample and occupation-level trade flows. 
There are a large number of marginal probabilities to examine.  It is therefore worth starting 
with some broad conclusions.  First, the marginal probabilities for  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  are always positive 
and the marginal probabilities for  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X −  are always negative.  This means that the incidence 
of switching is raised by offshore outsourcing and lowered by inshoring.  For most specifications 
the two marginal probabilities are statistically significant and in all but one case they are jointly 
significant.  See the row labeled ‘p-value for joint sig.’  Second, the marginal probability for 
) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  is the same for all worker types:  it is about 0.025 for industry switching and 0.015 for 
occupation switching.  In contrast, the marginal probability for  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X −  is about twice as large 
for college graduates and skilled white-collar workers as it is for non-college graduates and less-
skilled white-collar workers.
21  This means that non-college workers and less-skilled white-collar 
workers are taking a hit from offshore outsourcing without getting the benefits from inshoring. 
 
5.3.  Coefficient Magnitudes 
Assessing whether the coefficients are large or small can be subjective so we will use several 
criteria.  The median industry in table 1 experienced annual changes in inshoring and offshore 
outsourcing of about 0.10 log points.  Multiplying the marginal probabilities in table 3 by 0.10 
yields small impacts.  Another way of thinking about magnitudes is to ask what would happen if 
inshoring and offshore outsourcing trends over the nine-year span of 1996-2005 continued for 
                                                 
21 To see this either compare the industry switching columns 3 and 7 with 5 and 9 or compare the occupation 
switching columns 4 and 8 with 6 and 10.   19
another nine years.  From table 1, inshoring would increase by 0.99 log points and offshore 
outsourcing would increase by 0.18 log points.
22  From column 1 of table 3, this implies that 
offshore outsourcing raised the incidence of switching by a tiny 0.005 (= 0.025 × 0.18) while 
inshoring reduced the incidence by a much larger –0.031 (= –0.031 × 0.99).  Applying this 
analysis to all columns in table 3, it is immediately obvious that the inshoring effect dominates 
the offshore outsourcing effect so that the net impact of inshoring and offshore outsourcing is to 
reduce the incidence of switching.   
A very different way of assessing coefficient magnitudes is what is best described as a fear-
mongering experiment.  It will be used repeatedly in what follows.  From table 1, the growth of 
offshore outsourcing has been spectacular in business, professional and technical services (BPT).  
If all inshoring and offshore outsourcing grew over the next nine years as it did for BPT during 
1996-2005, then from table 1 offshore outsourcing would increase by 1.45 log points (≈ 0.16 × 9) 
and inshoring would increase by 1.23 log points (≈ 0.14 × 9).  We emphasize that this is a fear-
mongering exercise because it extrapolates based on the most rapidly growing major segment of 
service trade.  Such rapid growth would result in a 0.002 reduction in the incidence of industry 
switching:  0.002 = (0.025 × 1.45) – (0.031 × 1.23).  This result is reported in the row labeled 
‘Rapid-Growth Effect.’  (We find this to be a more neutral term than the ‘fear-mongering effect.’)  
Looking across columns, the rapid-growth effect is almost always negative.  The two exceptions 
are for non-college and less-skilled white-collar industry switchers.  Thus, even a fear-mongering 
exercise yields overall reductions in switching.   
Since the rapid-growth effects are not statistically significant, we can take fear-mongering the 
extra mile by looking at the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence intervals for the rapid-
growth effect.  This gives us an upper limit on the worst that could happen to American workers 
                                                 
22 Multiply by 9 the numbers for China and India in the ‘total’ row of table 1 i.e., 0.99 = 0.11×9 and 0.18 = 0.02×9.   20
under the already extreme rapid-growth scenario: industry switching would rise by 0.032 and 
occupation switching would rise by 0.007.  These strike us as small increases in switching for a 
worst-case-plus scenario that stretches over nine years. 
 
5.4.  Isolating the Low-Wage Effect 
As discussed earlier, there are two reasons for the growth of inshoring and offshore outsourcing 
with China and India.  The first is technological change in ICT which allowed all countries to 
engage in inshoring and offshore outsourcing.  The second is economic liberalization in China 
and India which allowed workers in these low-wage countries to compete with skilled American 
workers.  It is the latter aspect – low-wage competition for skilled white-collar jobs – that has 
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G8 flows is that technological change in ICT led to an expansion of inshoring and offshore 
outsourcing to all countries so that  ()
8




t j M M − −   captures that component of offshore 
outsourcing that is unique to China and India i.e., that is driven primarily by endowments of low-
paid skilled labor.   
To evaluate this rationale for using the G8 as a control, we constructed a rudimentary measure 
of the ICT costs of outsourcing, ICTjt, which builds on work by Bartel, Lach and Sicherman 
(2005) and McKinsey Global Institute (2003).  See appendix 4 for details.  As shown in appendix 
figure A.1, ICTjt is highly correlated with  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  (t = 7.40) and  ,1 ln( )
CI
jt X −  (t = 6.31).  On the   21
other hand, ICTjt is uncorrelated with   ()
8
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CI G
jt jt XX −−  (t  = 
0.69).  This supports our claim that  ()
8




t j M M − −  and  ()
8




t j X X − −   purges pure ICT 
effects and captures what is unique about China and India, namely, low wages for skilled 
workers. 
From the bottom panel of table 3, the coefficients on inshoring and offshore outsourcing have 
the expected signs in all but one case and are almost all statistically significant.  The magnitudes 
have changed somewhat and this is best summarized by the rapid-growth effect row.  Little has 
changed for the occupation-exposed sample, but the rapid-growth effect for the industry-exposed 
sample is more negative than in the upper panel.  There is thus more consistency now between 
the industry and occupation rapid-growth effects.  More importantly, the big picture remains the 
same:  a small or zero reduction in switching due to inshoring and offshore outsourcing. 
 
5.5.  Endogeneity 
A final issue is the endogeneity of the service trade flows in the upper panel of table 3.  It is 
possible that technological change in ICT is driving changes in trade flows and having 
independent effects on switching.  If so then the trade variables are spuriously picking up the 
effects of ICT technology change.  Since we know from section 5.4 and appendix 4 that 
developments in ICT are uncorrelated with  ()
8




t j M M − −  and  ()
8




t j X X − − , we can use 
these as instruments for   ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  and  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X − .  This leaves us with a just-identified model.  
The first-stage regressions appear in appendix A.7.  The second-stage probits appear in columns 
1 and 2 of table 4. We use the two-stage IV procedure described in Wooldridge (2001, p. 474). 
The ‘Exogeneity’ rows of table 4 indicate that we cannot reject endogeneity. For industry 
switching, the OLS and IV marginal probabilities of inshoring and offshore outsourcing are   22
nevertheless almost identical.  For occupation switching, the IV results are larger than the OLS 
results, but the inshoring marginal probability remains much larger than the offshore outsourcing 
marginal probability so that the rapid-growth effect for IV (-0.019) and OLS (-0.023) are very 
similar.  In short, both the OLS and IV estimates imply that inshoring and offshore outsourcing 
had no net effect on industry switching (the industry-exposed sample), but did reduce occupation 
switching (the occupation-exposed sample). 
 
5.6.  Sensitivity Analysis 
Our results will turn out to be insensitive to a large variety of specification changes.  These 
include broadening the list of low-wage countries beyond just China and India (table 7), deleting 
the technology-bubble years (table 8), correcting for CPS sample selection (table 9), including all 
private sector workers rather than just those exposed to offshore outsourcing and inshoring (table 
10), using different definitions of switching (table 11) and more.  We defer this discussion until 
section 8. 
 
6.  An Econometric Analysis of Unemployment 
We next turn to impacts on weeks spent unemployed as a share of total weeks in the labor force.  
This measure of unemployment was proposed by Murphy and Topel (1987).  We estimate the 
following linear regression: 
 
() ,1 ,1 ( ) ln( ) ln( ) (2)
CI CI it




weeks in labor force
θβ γ λ λ λ λ ε −− ∆= ∆ + + + + + + +
 
where the dependent variable is the change between t – 1 and t in the share of labor force weeks   23
spent unemployed.  Since we are working in changes, we first difference Wit.  This leaves only 
experience squared in ∆Wit.
23  
Since we will be arguing that the estimates of β and γ in equation (2) are small, we will need a 
benchmark for coefficient magnitudes.  Let σU, σX and σM be the standard deviations of the 
dependent variable,  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  and  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X − , respectively.  One modest benchmark is to require 
that one-standard-deviation changes in inshoring or offshore outsourcing change the dependent 
variable by at least σU/10.  This implies coefficients for inshoring of at least 0.01 in absolute 
value and coefficients for offshore outsourcing of at least 0.008.
24   An alternative modest 
benchmark would be an effect that reduced the share of time spent unemployed by at least 0.01 
over nine years (i.e., over 1996-2005).  This implies coefficients on inshoring of at least 0.008 in 
absolute value and coefficients on offshore outsourcing of at least 0.007.  Summarizing, both 
modest benchmarks lead one to expect coefficients of at least 0.007 in absolute value.  Any 
coefficient less than this would have to be considered tiny relative to all the hype surrounding 
offshore outsourcing.  
A quick perusal of table 5 reveals that every coefficient is less than 0.007 in absolute value.  
Further, even though statistical significance is often very low, every coefficient has a 1 percent 
confidence interval that lies strictly within the interval (–0.007, 0.007). Thus, we have precisely 
estimated very small effects of inshoring and offshore outsourcing on the share of labor-force 
weeks spent unemployed. 
The rapid-growth effects are mostly negative and, where statistically significant, always 
negative. This means that the net of effect of inshoring and offshore outsourcing has been to 
                                                 
23 The only time-varying variables in Wit are experience and experience squared. The change in experience is always 
1 and so ends up in the intercept. 
24 σU = 0.11, σX = 0.97 and σM = 1.43 so that σU / σX = 0.11 and σU / σM = 0.08.  These last two numbers are then 
divided by 10.   24
reduce the share of labor-force weeks spent unemployed.  Further, the rapid growth effects are 
always less than 0.007 in absolute value and so are small as judged by our benchmarks. 
The IV results appear in columns 3 and 4 of table 4 and do not alter these conclusions.  For 
the industry sample, the IV and OLS coefficients are the same size but the IV coefficients are 
much more significant.  For the occupation sample, the coefficients are insignificant for both IV 
and OLS.  To conclude, inshoring and offshore outsourcing combined likely reduced time spent 
unemployed and the net effect is precisely estimated to be small.  
 
7.  An Econometric Analysis of Earnings 
There is by now a very large empirical literature analyzing the impact of trade openness on wage 
levels and the distribution of income e.g. Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992), Lawrence and 
Slaughter (1993), Gaston and Trefler (1994, 1997), and Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999, 2002).  
All of these are limited to manufacturing.  For the effect of exchange rates on both 
manufacturing and services see Goldberg and Tracy (2003).  We estimate the effect of service 
inshoring and offshore outsourcing on earnings using the following linear regression: 
 
,1 ,1 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) (3)
CI CI
it it j t j t j o t r it earnings W M X θβ γ λ λ λ λ ε −− ∆= ∆ + + + + + + +  
 
Table 6 reports the results.  Consider column 1 first.  It reports the results for the industry-
exposed sample using industry-level imports.  The coefficient on offshore outsourcing is small 
and implies that even if  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M − grew for nine-years at 16 percent a year, as in the rapid-
growth effect, earnings would only fall by 0.01 percent (= –0.0001×0.016×9).  This is tiny.  The 
corresponding number for  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X −  is an earnings rise of 0.73 percent (= 0.006×0.014×9).     25
When the results are broken down by education we find small but precisely estimated effects 
for college graduates.  For non-college graduates we obtain a surprising reversal of signs.  This is 
possibly explained by selection.  To explore, we distinguish between switchers and non-
switchers. Column 7 reports results for workers who did not switch industries. For these workers, 
inshoring had a small effect on earnings, offshore outsourcing had no effect and the rapid-growth 
effect was small (a nine-year earnings increase of 0.7 percent, t = 3.28).  Column 8 reports 
results for workers who switched from one exposed industry to another.  Now the expected sign 
pattern appears but the effects are small and insignificant.  Column 9 reports results for workers 
who switched from an exposed industry to an unexposed industry.  There is no effect of either 
inshoring or offshore outsourcing for these workers.
25 
These results for switchers versus non-switchers are interesting, but do not explain why non-
college graduates have an unexpected sign on the coefficient for offshore outsourcing.  Column 
10 points to the role of young workers.  Workers between the ages of 18 and 24 are the source of 
the unexpected sign. 
Returning to the big picture, all the table 6 estimated coefficients are small and have 
sufficiently small standard errors that we can have some confidence in claiming that inshoring 
and offshore outsourcing have had either zero or small positive effects on earnings, selection 
notwithstanding. 
 
                                                 
25 Appendix table A.8 presents a transition matrix that tracks where switchers go and what this means for their 
earnings. 30 percent of workers in the industry-exposed sample switch their 4-digit industries. 10 of these 30 
percentage points involve workers who move to other exposed industries.  These workers see their earnings rise by 
0.01 log points in the year of transition.  This is likely due to selection:  at least some of the workers who move from 
one exposed industry to another do so because of better prospects in the new industry.  Another 9 of these 30 
percentage points involve workers who move to unexposed service industries.  They experience an earnings loss of 
0.11 log points. Finally, 4 of these 30 percent involve workers who switch to wholesale and retail trade and take an 
earnings hit of 0.15 log points.  Somewhat similar numbers hold for occupation switchers in the occupation-exposed 
sample.  See appendix table A.8 for details.   26
8.  Sensitivity to Alternative Specifications 
We have precisely estimated small effects of inshoring and offshore outsourcing on occupation 
switching, industry switching, weeks unemployed as a share of labor force weeks, and earnings.  
The remainder of this paper shows that our results are not sensitive to (1) the inclusion of other 
low-wage countries, (2) the exclusion of the years in which the technology bubble collapsed 
(2000-2001), (3) modeling the selection of workers into our March-to-March matched sample, (4) 
the inclusion of all private service workers in the analysis, not just exposed private service 
workers, (5) alternative definitions of our dependent variables (1-digit switching, transitions 
from employment to unemployment, hourly wages), (6) the use of contemporaneous trade flows 
rather than lagged trade flows, and (7) exclusion of all industries except business, professional 
and technical services.  The results appear in tables 7-13 and are quite stable across 
specifications.  In the few instances where an estimate becomes significant where previously it 
was not (at the 1 percent level) or becomes insignificant where previously it was significant, this 
is flagged in boldface in tables 7-13.  Since our results are similar for each of these alternative 
specifications reported below, there will be no new important insights and a reader who already 
believes that our results are robust can jump straight to the conclusions. 
 
8.1.  Beyond China and India:  Expanding the Set of Low-Wage Countries 
When it comes to U.S. trade in services, China and India are by far the major low-wage trading 
partners.  The BEA also publishes bilateral service trade data for all countries that have 
significant service trade with the United States.  Among low-wage countries, data are available 
for China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.  We therefore redefine 
CI
t j M 1 , −  and 
CI
t j X 1 , −  to be service trade with all six of these low-wage countries.  Table 7 reports the   27
results of re-estimating equations (1)-(3) with this redefinition.  Columns 1-3 correspond to 
column 1 of tables 3, 5 and 6, respectively.  Columns 4-6 correspond to column 2 of tables 3, 5 
and 6, respectively.  From the bold-faced numbers, significance changes slightly in only three 
cases.  All three have the right sign.  Two become significant (columns 3 and 4) and one 
becomes insignificant (column 6).  In all cases there is virtually no change in coefficient 
magnitudes. 
 
8.2.  Sensitivity to the Technology Bubble  
NASDAQ began its precipitous decline in March 2000 and continued to decline until mid-2002.  
As noted by Mann (2003), early research on offshore outsourcing was unable to disentangle the 
effects of offshore outsourcing from the effects of the bursting bubble.  We now have a longer 
data series with more post-bubble data.  Nevertheless, to eliminate the effects of the bubble we 
delete all data for the years 2000 and 2001.  Table 8 reports the results.  The one change is an 
earnings coefficient that becomes insignificant.  (See the boldfaced estimate.)  However, our 
main conclusions are unchanged. 
 
8.3.  Sample Selection Resulting from Unmatched Workers 
To be in our matched sample a worker must remain in the same dwelling from March of year t to 
March of year t + 1.  Since offshore outsourcing may encourage workers to move in search of 
jobs, our sample may not be randomly chosen and our estimates may be tainted by sample 
selection bias.  See Neumark and Kawaguchi (2004) and Goldberg and Tracy (2003).  In this 
section we use maximum likelihood to simultaneously estimate two equations, a selection 
equation and a second-stage equation (switching, unemployment or earnings).  Our specification   28
of the selection equation borrows from the migration literature which shows that mobility is 
strongly tied to family characteristics that have been excluded from our second-stage equations. 
These are family size, number of children, home ownership and whether the individual has a 
recent history of moving as proxied by whether the individual lived in the same house last year.
26  
These instruments are drawn from responses in the first of the two March surveys.  
The estimates appear in table 9.  Estimates of the second-stage equations appear in the top 
panel while estimates of the selection equation appear in the bottom panel.  The Wald test for 
selection is reported in the row labeled ‘Wald test of indep. Eqns.’ and indicates that in almost 
every case selection bias cannot be rejected.
27  Selection affects the fixed effects and the worker-
characteristic coefficients, but does not affect our estimates of inshoring and offshore 
outsourcing.  The latter estimates do not change in any economically significant way. 
 
8.4.  Exploiting Differences between Exposed and Unexposed Workers 
In section 4, we characterized industries with a binary variable indicating whether or not the 
industry was exposed to inshoring and offshore outsourcing.  We then compared the labor-force 
outcomes of exposed and unexposed workers.  In sections 5-7, we characterized exposed 
industries with continuous measures of exposure ( ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  and  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X − ).  We then dropped 
unexposed workers from the analysis and regressed the outcomes of exposed workers on   
) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  and  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X − .  In this section we combine the two approaches by including 
unexposed workers in our regression analysis.   
                                                 
26 In the first of the two March surveys the individual is asked if he or she lived in the same house last year.  The 
correlation of this response with whether the individual is matched across March surveys is 0.14. This is a small 
correlation and our results are unchanged when this variable is removed from the instrument set. 
27 The Wald test is calculated by comparing the results in table 9 with the results of fitting the second-stage equation 
without a selection correction.     29
To this end we introduce an exposure dummy for whether the individual is in the exposed 
sample (D = 1) or the unexposed sample (D = 0).  We also introduce a period dummy for 
whether or not the year is in the second half of our sample where offshore outsourcing was at far 
higher levels.  The period dummy equals 1 in 2001-2006 and 0 in 1996-2000.  To obtain a 
double difference we interact the exposure and period dummies.   We expect the interaction to be 
negative for earnings, which means that the earnings of exposed workers relative to unexposed 
workers have declined in recent years as offshore outsourcing intensified.  Likewise, we expect 
the interaction term to be positive for switching and unemployment.  The results appear in table 
10 where the interactions are statistically insignificant everywhere.  See the rows labeled ‘Diff-
of-Diff’.
28  Thus, including workers in unexposed industries does not affect our conclusions. 
 
8.5.  Alternative Dependent Variables 
So far, all of our switching results were based on 4-digit industry switching.  In columns 1 and 4 
of table 11 we report results for 1-digit switching.  We expect these estimates to be smaller and 
indeed they are about half the size of the estimates for 4-digit switching.  Interestingly, the 
inshoring coefficient for the industry-exposed sample now becomes significant.  Thus, even at 
the 1-digit switching level it remains true that the growth of inshoring and offshore outsourcing 
has been associated with small but statistically significant (t = –5.84) reductions in industry 
switching.  
So far, we have defined changes in unemployment in terms of changes in the proportion of 
labor-force hours spent unemployed.  An alternative definition is a binary indicator of 
                                                 
28 The estimates for  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  and  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X −  do not change much from our baselines: the rapid growth effect 
continues to imply small but positive impacts of inshoring and offshore outsourcing. There is the issue of what to do 
about the trade flows of unexposed workers since by definition these workers have no trade in their industries and 
occupations.  We therefore set the inshoring and offshore outsourcing variables to zero for unexposed workers.  (It 
does not matter that it is zero because the fixed effects absorb any time-invariant constant.)   30
transitioning from employment to unemployment.  If the worker is employed in the March 
reference week of year t and becomes unemployed in the March reference week of year t + 1, we 
assign 1 to the binary indicator of unemployment.  If the worker is employed in the March 
reference week of year t and the March reference week of year t + 1, we assign 0 to the binary 
indicator of unemployment.  A worker who is unemployed in the March reference week of year t 
is dropped from the sample regardless of employment status in t + 1.  (Unemployed workers in t 
are dropped only in this subsection.)  Columns 2 and 5 of table 11 present estimated marginal 
probabilities of a probit for transitioning to unemployment.  The only major change from our 
previous results is that inshoring now significantly reduces transitions into unemployment for 
both the industry- and occupation-exposed samples.  However, the coefficients remain 
economically small. 
We also re-estimated our earnings regressions using the change in real hourly wages as the 
dependent variable.  Hourly wages are defined as real annual earnings divided by hours worked 
last year.  Hours worked last year is weeks worked last year times hours worked each week.  The 
inshoring coefficient in column 3΄ is no longer significant (the industry-exposed sample).   
However, all of the coefficients remain as small as in our baseline specification.   
 
8.6.  Contemporaneous Rather than Lagged Trade Variables 
The dependent variables typically involve changes between year t – 1 and t.  To reduce issues of 
endogeneity, we lagged the trade variables so that  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j M −  and  ) ln( 1 ,
CI
t j X −  were used in place 
of  ) ln(
CI
jt M  and  ) ln(
CI
jt X .  In table 12, we re-estimate our equations (1)-(3) using 
contemporaneous trade variables rather than lagged ones.  As is apparent from the table, this 
tends to raise t-statistics without altering coefficient magnitudes.    31
 
8.7.  Business, Professional and Technical (BPT) Services 
Much of the press about offshore outsourcing focuses on BPT services to the exclusion of the 
other service categories in table 1 such as financial and insurance services.  That is, the press 
focuses on services for which U.S. comparative advantage is relatively weak.  Table 13 presents 
estimates of our equations (1)-(3) when only the eight BPT service subcategories are included in 
the analysis.  One might expect this to increase the coefficients on offshore outsourcing and 
decrease the coefficients on inshoring.  This does not happen.  Indeed, for industry and 
occupation switching the reverse happens.  Consequently, the net effect of inshoring and 
offshore outsourcing on switching is now more favorable to American workers.  This can be seen 
from the fear-mongering, rapid-growth effect which implies  a  large  reduction  in  switching:         
–0.035 (t = –11.45) for industry switching and –0.065 (t = –1.94) for occupation switching.    
 
8.7.  Conclusions from Sensitivity Analysis 
As is apparent from tables 7-13, our main conclusions survive the many alternative specifications 
presented in this section. 
 
9.  Conclusions 
The rise of service offshore outsourcing to China and India has brought with it something new – 
for the first time ever, educated U.S. workers are competing with educated but low-paid foreign 
workers.  Despite the public concern about this development, there has been almost no 
econometric work on the subject.  Most previous studies have simply counted the number of 
workers who are in industries or occupations that are exposed to offshore outsourcing.  Many   32
(but not all) of these studies then conclude from the resulting large counts that bad things must 
be happening to American workers.  We came up with similar large counts using CPS data, but 
then went on to ask about actual as opposed to conjectured effects on U.S. labor markets.  In so 
doing we emphasized that one cannot ignore the reverse flow (inshoring), which is the sale of 
services produced in the United States to unaffiliated buyers in China and India.  
Using March-to-March matched CPS data for 1996-2006 we examined the impacts of 
inshoring and offshore outsourcing on (1) occupation and industry switching, (2) weeks spent 
unemployed as a share of weeks in the labor force, and (3) earnings.  We precisely estimated 
small positive effects of inshoring and smaller negative effects of offshore outsourcing.  The net 
effect of inshoring and offshore outsourcing was positive.  We quantified this net effect using 
something of a fear-mongering experiment which we called the rapid-growth effect.  Suppose 
that over the next nine years inshoring and offshore outsourcing continued to grow at rates 
experienced during 1996-2005 in business, professional and technical services i.e., in segments 
where China and India have been particularly strong.  Then for workers in occupations that are 
exposed to offshore outsourcing (i) 4-digit occupational switching would decline by 2 percent, (ii) 
the share of weeks spent unemployed would fall by 0.1 percent and (iii) earnings would rise by 
1.5 percent.  That is, American workers on average would benefit.  Of course, these numbers are 
not annual changes – they are changes over nine years – and thus represent small benefits.  The 
important take away is that this extreme, fear-mongering exercise does not produce adverse 
impacts on U.S. workers. 
There are some darker spots in the U.S. labor market experience with offshore outsourcing.  
For workers in industries exposed to offshore outsourcing, the effects tend to be smaller (i.e. less 
positive).  The effects tend to be negative for workers without a college degree or who work in   33
less-skilled, white-collar jobs.  As with all labor-market impacts of international trade, there are 
winners and losers and, in the current U.S., the losers are less educated.  We do not want to 
minimize the effect on losers.  The loss of one’s job can be enormously damaging both 
financially and psychologically. 
These darker spots should not be allowed to obscure the big picture.  All of these effects are 
remarkably small given the hype associated with offshore outsourcing.  Further, they were 
estimated with sufficient precision that even the upper bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals 
involved small effects.  The estimates were also shown to hold across a wide variety of 
alternative specifications (section 8).  There can thus be only one way of describing the hype 
surrounding the labor-market impacts of inshoring and offshore outsourcing:  Much Ado About 
Nothing.    34
Appendix 1.  Trade Data 
All data are from the ‘other private services’ category of the BEA database.  We exclude (i) 
Installation, maintenance, and repair of equipment, (ii) Education, and (iii) Other because these 
categories are difficult to concord into industries and occupations.  In this we follow van Welsum 
and Vickery (2005). 
In 2003, the CPS updated its industry and occupation classifications from 1990 Census codes 
to 2002 Census codes.  To ensure that codes are consistent over our entire sample we converted 
the 1990 Census codes into 2002 Census codes. We then linked 2002 Census industry or 
occupation codes with BEA types of service trade.  In order to do this as accurately as possible 
we used (i) the 2002 NAICS manual for detailed industry definitions and the 2000 SOC manual 
for detailed occupation definitions, and (ii) Borga and Mann (2004) and U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1998) for detailed information about the coverage of each type of trade in services. 
Our measures of inshoring and offshore outsourcing in services come from published BEA 
data on U.S. international services cross-border trade and sales through affiliates.  Data for early 
years are sporadically missing.  This could either be because values of less than 0.5 million 
dollars are suppressed or because of disclosure concerns.  The two likely go hand in hand:  even 
a quick look through the data for each industry shows that when data are missing in a year there 
are usually neighboring years with data and these data involve very small values of trade.  We 
therefore used linear interpolation to fill in missing data.  However, none of our main results 
change when we restrict ourselves to non-imputed data.   
 
Appendix 2.  Switching 
Responses to questions about industry and occupation in the longest job held last year are known 
to be frequently miscoded.  This leads to overestimation of switching.  We therefore clean up the 
raw switching data using the yearly equivalent of the criteria in Moscarini and Thomsson (2006).  
Specifically, a switch is valid only if at least one of the following three events occurred.  (1) The 
class of worker changed.  (2) There was job search during the period.
29  (3) For an industry 
(occupation) switch the occupation (industry) changed.  Note that in most cases, criterion (3) was 
satisfied only when either (1) or (2) were satisfied.  That is, criterion (3) does not have much 
bite.  On a separate issue, see appendix 1 for a discussion of 2003 changes in Census definitions 
of occupations and industries. 
 
Appendix 3.  Skills 
Skills are defined by 1-digit Census major occupations.  (1) Unskilled blue-collar workers: 
farming, fishing, and forestry occupations; construction and extraction occupations; production 
occupations; transportation and material moving occupations.  (2) Skilled blue-collar workers:  
installation, maintenance, and repair occupations.  (3) Less-skilled white-collar workers: service 
occupations; sales and related occupations; office and administrative support occupations.  (4) 
Skilled white-collar workers:  management, business and financial occupations; professional and 
related occupations. 
  
Appendix 4.  The Relationship of ICT to Inshoring and Offshore Outsourcing 
We have argued that  ()
CI
jt M ln  and  ()
CI
jt X ln  are determined in part by technical change in ICT 
                                                 
29 In the variable coding of LOOKED, a worker looked for a job last year if she worked last year (_WORKYN=1), 
was a part-year worker (1<=WKSLYR<=51) and looked for work last year (LKEDPY=0).   35
and in part by political developments in China and India that led to an opening up of these 




jt M  and  ()
8 ln
G
jt X .  The argument was that if trends in inshoring and offshore outsourcing 
were exclusively driven by technical change then they might be expected to affect all trading 










jt X X  were 
driven primarily by political developments in China and India.  To assess this claim we introduce 
a rudimentary measure of the importance of ICT change in industry j.  For service industry j let 
ICT_Intensityj be investment in ICT equipment and software divided by total new equipment and 
software investment.  This measure was suggested in U.S. Department of Commerce (2003) and 
is used by Bartel, Lach and Sicherman (2005) in their examination of outsourcing and 
technological change. We extracted the data for ICT_Intensityj  from the BEA 1997 capital flow 
table.  Let Telecom_Costt be a time trend that captures technical change over time.  We obtain 
almost identical results whether we use a time trend or the annual leasing cost of a 2 Mbps fiber 
cable between New York and Mumbai (McKinsey Global Institute, 2003).  Our measure of ICT 
in industry j in year t is: 
__ jt j t ICT ICT Intensity Telecom Cost =×. 
The top panels of figure A.1 plot  ()
CI
jt M ln  and  ()
CI
jt X ln  against  ICTjt .  Each point is an 
industry (see table 1) in one of the 10 years 1996-2005.  From the graphs, the correlations are 
highly significant:  t = 7.40 for  ()
CI
jt M ln  and t = 6.31 for  ()
CI
jt X ln .  The bottom panels of figure 










jt X X  against ICTjt.  From the plots it is apparent that there 










jt X X .  This supports our 
claim that the ratio of China-India activity relative to G8 activity is orthogonal to ICT technical 
change.  The ratio is instead driven by political economy developments unique to China and 
India. 
Finally note that if we include ICTjt directly into our regressions it has no effect on our 
estimates.  
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 Table 1.  U.S. Unaffiliated Cross-Border Imports and Exports of Other Private Services, Average Annual Log Changes, 1996-2005
U.S. Exports (Inshoring) U.S. Imports (Offshore Outsourcing)
2005 Average Annual Log Change 2005 Average Annual Log Change
World World
China 
& India G8 CI - G8 World World
China 
& India G8 CI - G8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Business, professional, and technical services 33,637 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.04 13,490 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.06
Computer and information service 6,039 0.09 0.07 0.11 -0.04 2,469 0.20 0.39 0.22 0.18
Legal services 4,306 0.09 0.07 0.08 -0.01 914 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.04
Construction, architecture and engineering 4,080 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.06 422 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.13
Industrial engineering 2,327 0.11 0.01 0.11 -0.10 174 -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.10
Management consulting and public relations 2,219 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.10 1,694 0.14 0.22 0.12 0.09
Research, development and testing services 1,295 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.03 2,317 0.20 0.33 0.24 0.09
Advertising 606 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 1,005 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.06
Other BPT services 12,765 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.07 4,495 0.10 0.06 0.07 -0.01
Financial services 29,281 0.14 0.11 0.14 -0.03 6,549 0.09 0.07 0.08 -0.01
Insurance 6,831 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.02 28,482 0.18 -0.08 0.11 -0.19
Telecommunications 4,724 0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.07 4,658 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 -0.09
Total 74,473 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.00 53,179 0.10 0.02 0.09 -0.07
Notes: Columns 1 and 6 are in millions of dollars. All other columns are average annual log changes, 1996-2005. The two numbers in bold are used for the 'rapid-growth effect' described
in section 5.3.Table 2.  Summary Statistics and a Simple Differencing Approach
Occupation-Exposed Sample (N = 37,550)
4-Digit Occupation Switching Change in Unemployment Change in Earnings
Exposed Exposed - Unexposed Exposed Exposed - Unexposed Exposed Exposed - Unexposed
Mean Mean t Mean Mean t Mean Mean t
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1996 0.28 -0.006 -0.67 -0.003 0.002 0.60 0.047 -0.002 -0.09
1997 0.28 0.002 0.20 -0.003 0.002 0.76 0.047 -0.019 -1.07
1998 0.30 0.019 2.01 -0.002 0.003 1.30 0.057 -0.052 -3.17
1999 0.31 0.023 2.47 -0.001 0.002 0.79 0.014 -0.035 -2.18
2000 0.31 0.020 2.09 -0.002 0.001 0.40 0.042 -0.031 -1.83
2001 0.30 0.006 0.73 0.006 0.002 1.09 0.036 -0.030 -2.00
2002 0.36 0.011 1.16 0.005 0.003 1.41 -0.005 -0.043 -2.75
2003 0.31 0.000 -0.01 -0.003 0.000 -0.15 -0.017 -0.048 -3.35
2004 0.30 0.002 0.24 -0.002 0.003 1.21 -0.018 -0.052 -3.43
2005 0.31 0.013 1.51 -0.003 0.003 1.10 -0.002 -0.054 -3.64
All Years: n-digit occupation switching
4-digit 0.31 0.009 3.03
2-digit 0.20 -0.020 -7.79
1-digit 0.17 -0.021 -8.40
Notes: 'Year' is the year of the individual's first March survey. Columns 1, 4, and 7 report means for the occupation-exposed sample.
Columns 2, 5, and 8 report the difference of means for the exposed sample less the unexposed sample. The unexposed sample consists
of private workers in service occupations that are not exposed to inshoring and offshore outsourcing. See section 4 for details.
Columns 3, 6, and 9 report t-statistics for the differences. The top panel reports occupation switching at the 4-digit level. The bottom
panel reports occupation switching at other levels.  Table 3.  Probits for 4-digit Industry and Occupation Switching
College Non-College Skilled Less-Skilled
All Workers Graduates Graduates White Collar White Collar
Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ln(M
CI) 0.025 0.013 0.025 0.012 0.025 0.018 0.023 0.015 0.020 0.011
(7.01) (2.15) (5.93) (1.36) (2.53) (3.97) (7.59) (2.12) (2.43) (4.51)
ln(X
CI) -0.031 -0.033 -0.037 -0.036 -0.021 -0.027 -0.037 -0.039 -0.016 -0.020
(-1.95) (-3.34) (-2.36) (-2.89) (-1.17) (-3.17) (-2.45) (-4.27) (-1.01) (-0.60)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.550
Rapid-growth effect -0.002 -0.023 -0.009 -0.027 0.011 -0.008 -0.012 -0.026 0.009 -0.010
(-0.14) (-1.44) (-0.45) (-1.41) (1.23) (-0.52) (-0.65) (-1.70) (0.96) (-1.20)
Pseudo R
2 0.047 0.028 0.046 0.026 0.061 0.040 0.046 0.028 0.052 0.037
N 24,261 37,550 13,499 18,679 10,762 18,871 13,848 18,946 9,119 18,604
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6') (7') (8') (9') (10')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.015 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.009 0.028 0.014 0.021 0.004 0.018
(10.28) (5.84) (4.87) (2.90) (3.40) (7.33) (5.29) (5.82) (1.38) (5.01)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.033 -0.045 -0.046 -0.047 -0.008 -0.037 -0.041 -0.050 0.005 -0.039
(-3.06) (-3.64) (-5.37) (-2.70) (-0.57) (-3.47) (-4.55) (-3.32) (0.41) (-1.54)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.249 0.120
Rapid-Growth Effect -0.019 -0.025 -0.030 -0.033 0.004 -0.005 -0.030 -0.032 0.012 -0.022
(-1.25) (-1.60) (-1.93) (-1.39) (0.30) (-0.37) (-2.02) (-1.56) (0.84) (-1.19)
Pseudo R
2 0.046 0.028 0.046 0.026 0.060 0.041 0.045 0.027 0.051 0.037
N 24,261 37,550 13,499 18,679 10,762 18,871 13,848 18,946 9,119 18,604
Notes: Each column presents two separate probits, the top panel with M
CI and X





probit includes worker characteristics (experience, experience squared, years of schooling and dummies for sex, race, marital status and
veteran status) as well as fixed effects for 2-digit industries, 2-digit occupations, year and state. In odd-numberd columns the dependent
variable is 4-digit industry switching and the sample is the industry-exposed sample. In even-numberd columns the dependent variable is 4-
digit occupation switching and the sample is the occupation-exposed sample. Marginal probabilities are reported. t-statistics adjusted for
clustering at the industry level (odd columns) or the occupation level (even columns) are in parentheses. 'p-value for joint sig.' is the test for
the joint significance of the two trade variables. A number less than 0.01 indicates significance. 'Rapid-growth effect' is 1.45 times the







unemployment Change in earnings
Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(M
CI) 0.027 0.033 0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0028 -0.0003
(7.90) (6.49) (1.96) (-1.12) (-2.50) (-0.05)
ln(X
CI) -0.031 -0.054 -0.0018 0.0008 0.0068 0.0133
(-2.20) (-4.68) (-10.10) (0.99) (14.52) (2.18)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.440 0.002 0.128
Rapid-growth effect 0.001 -0.019 -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.016
Exogeneity (χ
2 or F) 6.07 9.35 7.88 8.86 6.82 0.82
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 24,261 37,550 24,261 37,550 24,261 37,550
Estimation Method 2SIV 2SIV 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Notes: 'Ind.' refers to the industry-exposed sample and 'Occ.' refers to the occupation-exposed sample. Marginal
probabilities of probits or OLS coefficients are reported. t-statistics are in parentheses and are clustered at the industry
level (for the industry sample) or the occupation level (for the occupation sample). Columns 1-2 correspond to columns 1-2
of table 3. Columns 3-4 correspond to columns 1-2 of table 5. Columns 5-6 correspond to columns 1-2 of table 6. See the
notes to those tables for additional information about the specification.Table 5.  Change in Unemployed Weeks as a Share of Weeks in the Labor Force
College Non-College Skilled Less-Skilled
All Workers Graduates Graduates White Collar White Collar
Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ln(M
CI) 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0019 0.0016 0.0001 0.0002 0.0028 0.0029
(0.62) (0.82) (-1.57) (-0.14) (1.28) (1.00) (0.13) (0.21) (6.65) (2.01)
ln(X
CI) -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0039 -0.0012 -0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0039 -0.0038
(-7.08) (-2.57) (-2.28) (-1.43) (-14.18) (-1.55) (-7.25) (-1.02) (-5.34) (-3.87)
Change in worker
charact. and f.e.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.012 0.088 0.047 0.217 0.000 0.308 0.008 0.283 0.016 0.294
Rapid-growth effect -0.002 -0.001  -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
(-1.98) (-0.69) (-3.35) (-1.07) (-0.82) (0.37) (-2.82) (-1.65) (-1.42) (-0.17)
R
2 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.005
N 24,261 37,550 13,499 18,679 10,762 18,871 13,848 18,946 9,119 18,604
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6') (7') (8') (9') (10')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0021 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0016 -0.0009
(0.38) (-1.08) (-2.66) (-0.91) (5.62) (0.15) (-0.72) (-0.72) (1.51) (-1.52)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.0017 0.0007 0.0010 0.0008 -0.0061 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0012 -0.0051 0.0003
(-9.95) (0.93) (4.17) (0.73) (-8.14) (0.70) (-2.60) (0.79) (-1.85) (0.46)
Change in worker
charact. and f.e.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.000 0.464 0.030 0.650 0.010 0.790 0.142 0.707 0.286 0.370
Rapid-Growth Effect -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(-8.38) (-0.09) (-0.99) (-0.56) (-5.78) (0.47) (-2.36) (0.46) (-1.97) (-0.64)
R
2 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.005
N 24,261 37,550 13,499 18,679 10,762 18,871 13,848 18,946 9,119 18,604
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in unemployed weeks as a share of total weeks in the labor force. Each column presents
two separate OLS regressions, the top panel with M
CI and X





include the change in time-varying worker characteristics (change in experience squared) as well as fixed effects for 2-digit industries, 2-
digit occupations, year and state. The sample alternates between columns. The industry-exposed sample is in odd-numberd columns
and the occupation-exposed sample is in even-numberd columns. t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the industry level (odd columns)
or occupation level (even columns) are in parentheses. 'p-value for joint sig.' is the joint test for the significance of the two trade
variables. A number less than 0.01 indicates significance. 'Rapid-growth effect' is 1.45 times the coefficient on the offshore
outsourcing variable plus 1.23 times the coefficient on the inshoring variable.Table 6.  Change in Log Earnings
Switchers to:









Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Occ. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ln(M
CI) -0.0001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.014 0.016 0.025 0.001 -0.010 0.006 0.050
(-0.04) (-0.38) (-7.54) (-2.06) (4.00) (5.36) (0.64) (-1.20) (0.63) (6.10)
ln(X
CI) 0.006 0.015 0.008 0.028 -0.003 -0.011 0.005 0.009 -0.007 -0.043
(2.13) (2.83) (5.87) (3.29) (-0.58) (-1.54) (5.00) (0.48) (-1.13) (-3.19)
Change in worker
charact. and f.e.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.146 0.059 0.003 0.018 0.003 0.002 0.033 0.450 0.189 0.009
Rapid-growth effect 0.007 0.015 -0.002 0.014 0.020 0.023 0.007 -0.004 0.000 0.020
(1.43) (1.99) (-0.61) (1.04) (1.66) (2.81) (3.28) (-0.28) (-0.02) (0.87)
R
2 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.066 0.034 0.062
N 24,261 37,550 13,499 18,679 10,762 18,871 16,903 2,472 4,886 1,557
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6') (7') (8') (9') (10')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) -0.0004 0.001 -0.006 -0.011 0.008 0.021 0.001 -0.013 -0.003 0.017
(-0.35) (0.24) (-8.88) (-1.55) (2.73) (10.86) (0.80) (-2.30) (-0.53) (0.63)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) 0.0064 0.011 0.007 0.026 0.004 -0.012 0.007 0.021 -0.016 0.013
(10.24) (2.44) (3.02) (1.68) (1.03) (-1.28) (3.35) (2.04) (-1.18) (2.05)
Change in worker
charact. and f.e.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.001 0.109 0.007 0.156 0.114 0.000 0.017 0.132 0.530 0.058
Rapid-Growth Effect 0.007 0.015 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.010 0.008 -0.025 0.041
(7.35) (1.87) (-0.13) (0.82) (1.91) (1.43) (5.49) (0.56) (-1.25) (1.20)
R
2 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.015 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.066 0.034 0.060
N 24,261 37,550 13,499 18,679 10,762 18,871 16,903 2,472 4,886 1,557
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log earnings. Each column presents two separate OLS regressions, the top panel with M
CI
and X




G8. The regressions include the change in time-varying worker characteristics
(change in experience squared) as well as fixed effects for 2-digit industries, 2-digit occupations, year and state. The 'Ind.' columns use the
industry-exposed sample and the 'Occ.' columns use the occupation-exposed sample. t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the industry level
('Ind.' columns) or the occupation level ('Occ.' columns) are in parentheses. 'p-value for joint sig.' is the joint test for the significance of the
two trade variables. A number less than 0.01 indicates significance. 'Rapid-growth effect' is 1.45 times the coefficient on the offshore
outsourcing variable plus 1.23 times the coefficient on the inshoring variable.Table 7.  Robustness:
Inshoring and Service Offshoring from All Available Low-Wage Countries
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(M
CI) 0.030 0.0005 -0.0022 0.019 0.0009 -0.0031
(5.29) (0.55) (-1.22) (2.94) (0.98) (-0.47)
ln(X
CI) -0.029 -0.0019 0.0062 -0.039 -0.0017 0.0155
(-2.56) (-8.74) (2.72) (-3.65) (-2.44) (2.05)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.11 0.18
Rapid-growth effect .008 -.002 .004 -.020 -.001 .015
(0.59) (-1.51) (1.21) (-1.21) (-0.70) (1.36)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
N 24,261 24,261 24,261 37,550 37,550 37,550
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.015 0.0002 -0.0019 0.029 -0.0010 0.0017
(9.55) (0.43) (-0.95) (7.85) (-1.69) (0.34)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.021 -0.0012 0.0041 -0.039 0.0012 0.0031
(-3.38) (-5.95) (6.71) (-3.88) (1.46) (1.13)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.41
Rapid-Growth Effect -.003 -.001 .002 -.007 .000 .006
(-0.32) (-2.27) (0.75) (-0.70) (-0.05) (0.93)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
N 24,261 24,261 24,261 37,550 37,550 37,550
Notes: In this table the service trade variables have been redefined to include not just China and India, but all other low-
wage countries for which data are available. Marginal probabilities from probits are reported in columns 1 and 4. OLS
estimates are reported in the remaining columns. t-statistics are in parentheses and are clustered at the industry level (for
the industry sample) or the occupation level (for the occupation sample). Columns 1 and 4 correspond to columns 1-2 of
table 3. Columns 2 and 5 correspond to columns 1-2 of table 5. Columns 3 and 6 correspond to columns 1-2 of table 6.
See the notes to those tables for additional information. A bolded estimate means that its statistical significance has
changed from that in the baseline specifications of tables 3, 5, or 6. In particular, the coefficient has gone from
significant to insignificant or from insignificant to significant.Table 8.  Robustness: Deleting the Technology-Bubble Years (2000-2001)
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(M
CI) 0.019 -0.0005 -0.0018 0.010 0.0004 0.0001
(4.73) (-0.61) (-1.26) (1.42) (0.42) (0.02)
ln(X
CI) -0.027 -0.0017 0.0073 -0.030 -0.0009 0.0115
(-1.75) (-6.87) (1.94) (-3.06) (-1.54) (1.83)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.29 0.23
Rapid-growth effect -.005 -.003 .007 -.023 .000 .014
(-0.33) (-2.29) (1.41) (-1.27) (-0.42) (1.45)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
N 19,178 19,178 19,178 30,446 30,446 30,446
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.010 -0.0005 -0.0015 0.020 -0.0008 0.0038
(4.57) (-1.85) (-1.92) (4.53) (-0.96) (0.70)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.027 -0.0013 0.0093 -0.046 0.0004 0.0062
(-2.63) (-6.26) (7.50) (-4.21) (0.65) (1.56)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.61 0.34
Rapid-Growth Effect -.018 -.002 .009 -.028 -.001 .013
(-1.20) (-8.47) (7.73) (-1.67) (-0.56) (1.24)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
N 19,178 19,178 19,178 30,446 30,446 30,446
Notes: In this table the years 2000 and 2001 are omitted from the analysis. The table is identical in structure to table 7. See the table 7
notes.Table 9.  Robustness: Correcting for CPS Sample Selection
Industry-Exposed Sample Occupation-Exposed Sample
Dependent Industry Change in Change in Occupation Change in Change in
variable switching unemployment log earnings switching unemployment log earnings
Second-Stage Equation
ln(M
CI) 0.025 0.0006 -0.0004 0.012 0.0007 -0.0009
(6.85) (0.61) (-0.28) (3.27) (0.66) (-0.29)
ln(X
CI) -0.030 -0.0023 0.0058 -0.032 -0.0017 0.0147
(-1.93) (-7.13) (2.20) (-2.90) (-1.15) (1.90)
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.015 0.0005 -0.0012 0.020 -0.0002 0.0013
(11.88) (1.26) (-1.35) (5.89) (-0.18) (0.50)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.032 -0.0024 0.0077 -0.043 0.0000 0.0109
(-2.92) (-3.36) (12.32) (-2.65) (-0.02) (1.19)
Worker Charact. and f.e.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38,348 38,348 38,348 38,348 38,348 38,348 58,633 58,633 58,633 58,633 58,633 58,633
uncensored N 24,949 24,949 24,968 24,968 24,339 24,339 38,259 38,259 38,260 38,260 37,682 37,682
log likelihood -37,074 -37,081 -5,859 -5,859 -50,211 -50,210 -57,342 -57,341 -8,147 -8,149 -75,181 -75,186
Wald test of indep. Eqns 2.82 2.50 4.43 4.31 11.77 11.63 26.98 28.62 5.79 5.71 9.31 9.22
Selection Equation
Excluded Regressors
Family size -0.056 -0.056 -0.053 -0.053 -0.052 -0.052 -0.044 -0.044 -0.041 -0.041 -0.038 -0.038
(-7.50) (-7.41) (-12.62) (-12.68) (-8.57) (-8.59) (-5.07) (-5.07) (-8.59) (-8.58) (-6.60) (-6.59)
Number of children 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001
(3.26) (3.27) (6.46) (6.49) (4.92) (4.94) (1.03) (1.03) (1.25) (1.25) (0.29) (0.30)
House owner 0.618 0.618 0.623 0.623 0.599 0.599 0.606 0.606 0.604 0.604 0.591 0.591
(20.76) (20.61) (20.57) (20.56) (15.43) (15.42) (22.37) (22.35) (31.65) (31.65) (29.66) (29.68)
Same house last year 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.035 0.029 0.029 0.079 0.079 0.074 0.075 0.072 0.072
(2.23) (2.23) (5.81) (5.77) (2.28) (2.27) (3.12) (3.14) (5.30) (5.33) (4.42) (4.45)
Other Regressors
Experience 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.029
(8.79) (8.78) (14.39) (14.39) (11.87) (12.07) (12.75) (12.70) (21.13) (21.20) (25.87) (25.78)
Experience squared -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-3.86) (-3.89) (-4.69) (-4.70) (-4.50) (-4.52) (-5.10) (-5.10) (-6.55) (-6.57) (-6.68) (-6.68)
Years of schooling 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.024 0.024 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.029 0.029
(6.79) (6.86) (20.64) (20.90) (7.89) (7.83) (7.61) (7.49) (15.68) (15.44) (12.87) (12.68)
Married 0.180 0.180 0.172 0.172 0.175 0.175 0.154 0.154 0.149 0.149 0.142 0.142
(6.79) (12.94) (11.22) (11.24) (10.84) (10.81) (11.91) (11.90) (18.56) (18.54) (11.92) (11.91)
Male 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.014 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.015 -0.015 -0.034 -0.034
(0.86) (0.83) (0.96) (0.95) (-1.23) (-1.25) (-1.46) (-1.52) (-1.56) (-1.58) (-2.99) (-3.02)
White 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.086 0.089 0.088 0.085 0.085 0.082 0.082 0.080 0.080
(3.90) (3.94) (8.07) (8.22) (5.95) (5.93) (3.74) (3.73) (6.89) (6.88) (6.29) (6.30)
Veteran -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038 -0.034 -0.033 -0.016 -0.016 -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015
(-3.06) (-3.10) (-3.40) (-3.41) (-2.24) (-2.22) (-0.66) (-0.69) (-0.95) (-1.00) (-0.81) (-0.85)
ln(M
CI) -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 0.018 0.02 0.023
(-0.75) (-1.30) (-1.07) (1.71) (3.96) (4.00)
ln(X
CI) 0.015 0.012 0.012 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(1.25) (3.18) (3.70) (-0.19) (-0.77) (-0.62)
ln(M
CI/M
G8) -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.009 0.014
(-0.92) (-0.78) (0.08) (3.61) (3.25)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) 0.024 0.020 0.019 -0.003 0.000
(3.63) (4.42) (11.22) (-0.54) (0.02)
Notes: In this table, second-stage equations are simultaneously estimated together with a selection equation. The latter is a probit for whether a worker entering the sample in
period t is matched in period t +1. For the selection equation, coefficients are reported. For the second-stage equations, marginal probabilities are reported in columns 1 and
4 and coefficients are reported in the remaining columns. t-statistics are in parentheses and are clustered at the industry level (for the industry sample) or the occupation level
(for the occupation sample). Columns 1 and 4 correspond to columns 1-2 of table 3. Columns 2 and 5 correspond to columns 1-2 of table 5. Columns 3 and 6 correspond to
columns 1-2 of table 6. See the notes to those tables for additional information about the second-stage equations. A bolded estimate means that its statistical significance has
changed from that in the baseline specifications of tables 3, 5, or 6.  In particular, the coefficient has gone from significant to insignificant or from insignificant to significant.Table 10.  Robustness: All Workers in Private Services
Industry-Exposed and Occupation-Exposed and














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(M
CI) 0.017 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.014 0.0004 -0.0022
(2.10) (-0.90) (-0.12) (1.89) (0.50) (-0.56)
ln(X
CI) -0.027 -0.0012 0.0071 -0.030 -0.0006 0.0044
(-1.43) (-1.38) (3.17) (-3.63) (-1.01) (0.80)
Exposure dummy 0.076 0.0141 -0.0517 0.07 0.0032 -0.0269
(0.91) (2.45) (-3.96) (1.72) (1.25) (-1.17)
Diff-of-Diff 0.040 0.0004 -0.0130 0.01 -0.0007 -0.0031
(2.47) (0.20) (-1.28) (0.41) (-0.43) (-0.33)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
Rapid-growth effect -.008 -.002 .009 -.016 .000 .002
(-0.46) (-3.05) (2.94) (-1.32) (-0.11) (0.23)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01
N 78,586 78,586 78,586 115,090 115,090 115,090
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.008 -0.0006 0.0016 0.021 -0.0008 0.0008
(1.55) (-1.67) (0.97) (4.50) (-1.19) (0.23)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.030 -0.0012 0.0079 -0.046 0.0013 0.0007
(-3.04) (-1.62) (5.46) (-3.92) (1.80) (0.15)
Exposure dummy -0.019 0.0024 0.0019 -0.056 0.0027 -0.0105
(-0.45) (0.39) (0.20) (-2.04) (1.13) (-0.36)
Diff-of-Diff 0.033 -0.0004 -0.0095 0.001 -0.0008 -0.0020
(2.20) (-0.18) (-0.95) (0.06) (-0.52) (-0.24)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.15
Rapid-growth effect -.025 -.002 .012 -.026 .000 .002
(-1.37) (-3.57) (4.08) (-2.16) (0.53) (0.22)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01
N 78,586 78,586 78,586 115,090 115,090 115,090
Notes: In this table we add to our sample those private service workers in unexposed industries (columns 1-3) or unexposed 
occupations (columns 4-6). 'Exposure dummy' is a dummy for whether the worker is exposed (=1) or not (=0) to inshoring or offshore
outsourcing. 'Diff-of-Diff' is the interaction of the exposure dummy with a dummy for whether the year is in the 2001-2006 period (=
1) or not (= 0). For unexposed workers service trade is by definition 0 so that the inshoring and offshore outsourcing variables are set
to 0.   The table is identical in structure to table 7.  See the table 7 notes.Table 11.  Robustness: Alternative Dependent Variables


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(M
CI) 0.012 0.0013 0.0037 -0.004 0.0029 -0.0010
(1.74) (1.39) (2.49) (-1.11) (2.46) (-0.20)
ln(X
CI) -0.025 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.016 -0.0041 0.0151
(-3.18) (-3.32) (-0.49) (-2.12) (-3.70) (3.72)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.02
Rapid-growth effect -.013 .000 .003 -.025 -.001 .017
(-5.84) (-0.02) (1.14) (-2.00) (-0.70) (1.78)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01
N 24,261 23,876 24,261 37,550 37,017 37,550
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.001 0.0005 0.0009 0.004 0.0017 -0.0006
(0.46) (0.89) (1.57) (1.10) (1.08) (-0.12)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.028 -0.0030 0.0010 -0.021 -0.0025 0.0131
(-3.43) (-2.78) (0.52) (-2.28) (-1.85) (2.40)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.03 0.18 0.09
Rapid-Growth Effect -.033 -.003 .003 -.020 -.001 .015
(-4.70) (-4.65) (0.90) (-1.56) (-0.33) (1.42)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01
N 24,261 23,876 24,261 37,550 37,017 37,550
Notes: Column 1 (2) is a probit for 1-digit industry (occupation) switching. This differs from the 4-digit switching reported in all other
tables. Column 2 is a probit for a binary dependent variable which equals 1 if the worker went from being employed in March of year t to
being unemployed in March of year t + 1. Column 3 is a linear regression of the growth in hourly wages where hourly wages is defined as
real annual earnings divided by hours worked last year (weeks worked last year times hours worked each week). Marginal probabilities
from probits are reported in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5. OLS estimates are reported in the remaining columns. The table is identical in structure
to table 7.  See the table 7 notes.Table 12.  Robustness: Contemporaneous Inshoring and Offshore Outsourcing Variables
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(M
CI) 0.027 -0.0001 0.0002 0.016 0.0004 -0.0018
(11.45) (-0.08) (0.24) (2.65) (0.43) (-0.52)
ln(X
CI) -0.034 -0.0019 0.0085 -0.040 -0.0009 0.0135
(-2.91) (-4.29) (1.88) (-3.37) (-1.67) (2.77)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.30 0.07
Rapid-growth effect -0.002 -0.002 0.011 -0.026 -0.001 0.014
(-0.13) (-1.99) (1.71) (-1.66) (-0.45) (2.11)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
N 24,261 24,261 24,261 37,550 37,550 37,550
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.015 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.021 0.0000 0.0015
(11.40) (-0.20) (-0.60) (4.33) (-0.06) (0.46)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.031 -0.0020 0.0088 -0.046 0.0001 0.0054
(-3.38) (-2.33) (7.32) (-3.46) (0.17) (2.80)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.98 0.06
Rapid-Growth Effect -0.016 -0.003 0.010 -0.026 0.000 0.009
(-1.20) (-13.74) (9.13) (-1.87) (0.07) (1.70)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
N 24,261 24,261 24,261 37,550 37,550 37,550
Notes: In this table we use imports and exports for year t rather than year t - 1. The table is identical in structure to table
7.  See the table 7 notes.Table 13.  Robustness: Only Business, Professional and Technical Services
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(M
CI) 0.021 -0.0006 0.0006 0.000 0.0014 -0.0024
(3.00) (-1.06) (0.28) (-0.01) (1.38) (-0.51)
ln(X
CI) -0.052 -0.0026 0.0109 -0.053 -0.0012 0.0211
(-9.14) (-5.98) (4.66) (-3.46) (-1.45) (2.65)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.03
Rapid-growth effect -.035 -.004 .014 -.065 .001 .023
(-11.45) (-10.55) (26.08) (-1.94) (0.29) (3.31)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
N 11,927 11,927 11,927 32,481 32,481 32,481
(1') (2') (3') (4') (5') (6')
ln(M
CI/M
G8) -0.017 0.0005 0.0009 0.022 -0.0001 0.0047
(-2.17) (0.39) (0.24) (1.25) (-0.05) (0.50)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.042 -0.0016 0.0049 -0.054 0.0007 0.0170
(-19.40) (-4.42) (1.89) (-2.81) (0.68) (1.91)
Worker characteristics
and fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for joint sig. 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.77 0.02
Rapid-Growth Effect -.076 -.001 .007 -.034 .001 .028
(-8.40) (-0.76) (2.78) (-0.73) (0.19) (1.15)
R
2 or pseudo-R
2 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
N 11,927 11,927 11,927 32,481 32,481 32,481
Notes: In this table we only include those service trade categories that feed into Business, Professional, and Technical (BPT)







1996 71% 95% 67%
1997 70% 95% 67%
1998 70% 96% 67%
1999 69% 96% 66%
2000 75% 97% 73%
2001 64% 94% 60%
2002 65% 92% 60%
2003 65% 94% 61%
2004 57% 95% 54%
2005 59% 94% 55%
average 67% 95% 64%
Notes: 'Naïve Match' is the proportion of all civilian
adults in March of the indicated year who can be
matched to an individual in March of the subsequent
year. The naïve match is based on a household identifier,
a household number, and an individual line number
within a household. 'Valid Match' is the percentage of
naïve matches that survive the S|R|A (sex, race, age)
merge criterion. 'Final Match' is the final match rate and
equals (naïve match)x(valid match).
Table A.1.  Matching Rates for CPS DataTable A.2.  Concordance between Census Industry Codes and NAICS/BEA Codes
2002 2002
Census NAICS
Codes 2002 Census Categories Codes BEA 'Other Private Service' Codes
7470 Advertising and related services  5418 advertising
7290 Architectural, engineering, and related services  5413 construction, architecture, engineering services
6490 Software publishing 5112 computer and information services
6675 Internet publishing and broadcasting  5161 computer and information services
6692 Internet service providers 5181 computer and information services
6695 Data processing, hosting, and related services 5182 computer and information services
6780 Other information services 5191 exc. 51912 computer and information services
7380 Computer systems design and related services  5415 computer and information services
6870 Banking and related activities 521, 52211,52219 finance
6880 Savings institutions, including credit unions  52212, 52213 finance
6890 Non-depository credit and related activities 5222, 5223 finance
6970 Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, and other financial investments 523, 525 finance
7370 Specialized design services  5414 industrial engineering
6990 Insurance carriers and related activities  524 insurance
7270 Legal services  5411 legal services
7390 Management, scientific, and technical consulting services 5416 management, consulting, public relation services
7280 Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, and payroll services 5412 other business, professional and technical services
7490 Other professional, scientific, and technical services  5419 exc. 54194 other business, professional and technical services
7590 Business support services  5614 other business, professional and technical services
7780 Other administrative and other support services  5611, 5612, 5619 other business, professional and technical services
7460 Scientific research and development services  5417 research, development and testing services
6680 Wired telecommunications carriers  5171 telecommunication
6690 Other telecommunications services  517 exc. 5171, 5175 telecommunicationTable A.3.  Concordance between Census Occupation Codes and NAICS/BEA Codes
2002 2002
Census SOC
Codes 2002 Census Categories Codes BEA 'Other Private Service' Codes
0040 Advertising and promotions managers 11-2011 advertising
4800 Advertising sales agents 41-3011  advertising
0300 Engineering managers 11-9041 construction, architecture, engineering services
1300 Architects, except naval 17-1010  construction, architecture, engineering services
1310 Surveyors, cartographers, and photogrammetrists 17-1020  construction, architecture, engineering services
1360 Civil engineers 17-2051  construction, architecture, engineering services
1560 Surveying and mapping technicians 17-3031  construction, architecture, engineering services
0110 Computer and information systems managers 11-3021 computer and information services
1000 Computer scientists and systems analysts 15-10XX computer and information services
1010 Computer programmers 15-1021  computer and information services
1020 Computer software engineers 15-1030 computer and information services
1040 Computer support specialists 15-1041  computer and information services
1060 Database administrators 15-1061  computer and information services
1100 Network and computer systems administrators 15-1071  computer and information services
1110 Network systems and data communications analysts 15-1081  computer and information services
1400 Computer hardware engineers 17-2061  computer and information services
5800 Computer operators 43-9011  computer and information services
5810 Data entry keyers 43-9021  computer and information services
5830 Desktop publishers 43-9031  computer and information services
5920 Statistical assistants 43-9111  computer and information services
0120 Financial managers 11-3031 finance
0830 Credit analysts 13-2041  finance
0840 Financial analysts 13-2051  finance
0850 Personal financial advisors 13-2052  finance
0900 Financial examiners 13-2061  finance
0910 Loan counselors and officers 13-2070  finance
0950 Financial specialists, all other 13-2099  finance
4820 Securities, commodities, and financial services sales agents 41-3031  finance
5200 Brokerage clerks 43-4011  finance
5230 Credit authorizers, checkers, and clerks 43-4041  finance
5330 Loan interviewers and clerks 43-4131 finance
5340 New accounts clerks 43-4141  finance
1350 Chemical engineers 17-2041  industrial engineering
1410 Electrical and electronic engineers 17-2070  industrial engineering
1430 Industrial engineers, including health and safety 17-2110  industrial engineering
1460 Mechanical engineers 17-2141  industrial engineering
1550 Engineering technicians, except drafters 17-3020  industrial engineering
0540 Claims adjusters, appraisers, examiners, and investigators 13-1030  insurance
0860 Insurance underwriters 13-2053  insurance
1200 Actuaries 15-2011 insurance
4810 Insurance sales agents 41-3021  insurance
5840 Insurance claims and policy processing clerks 43-9041  insurance
2140 Paralegals and legal assistants 23-2011 legal services
2150 Miscellaneous legal support workers 23-2090  legal services
0010 Chief executives 11-1011 management, consulting, public relation services
0020 General and operations managers 11-1021 management, consulting, public relation services
0050 Marketing and sales managers 11-2020 management, consulting, public relation services
0060 Public relations managers 11-2031 management, consulting, public relation services
0100 Administrative services managers 11-3011 management, consulting, public relation services
0130 Human resources managers 11-3040 management, consulting, public relation services
0140 Industrial production managers 11-3051 management, consulting, public relation services
0150 Purchasing managers 11-3061 management, consulting, public relation services
0160 Transportation, storage, and distribution managers 11-3071 management, consulting, public relation services
0600 Cost estimators 13-1051 management, consulting, public relation services
0710 Management analysts 13-1111  management, consulting, public relation services
0730 Other business operations specialists 13-11XX management, consulting, public relation services
1220 Operations research analysts 15-2031  management, consulting, public relation servicesTable A.3. Concordance between Census Occupation Codes and NAICS/BEA Codes (continued)
2002 2002
Census SOC
Codes 2002 Census Categories Codes BEA 'Other Private Service' Codes
0800 Accountants and auditors 13-2011  other business, professional and technical services
0820 Budget analysts 13-2031  other business, professional and technical services
0940 Tax preparers 13-2082 other business, professional and technical services
3320 Diagnostic related technologists and technicians 29-2030  other business, professional and technical services
4940 Telemarketers 41-9041  other business, professional and technical services
5000 First-line supervisors/managers of office & admin. support 43-1011  other business, professional and technical services
5010 Switchboard operators, including answering service 43-2011  other business, professional and technical services
5020 Telephone operators 43-2021  other business, professional and technical services
5030 Communications equipment operators, all other 43-2099 other business, professional and technical services
5100 Bill and account collectors 43-3011  other business, professional and technical services
5110 Billing and posting clerks and machine operators 43-3021  other business, professional and technical services
5120 Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 43-3031  other business, professional and technical services
5140 Payroll and timekeeping clerks 43-3051  other business, professional and technical services
5150 Procurement clerks 43-3061  other business, professional and technical services
5160 Tellers 43-3071 other business, professional and technical services
5210 Correspondence clerks 43-4021  other business, professional and technical services
5240 Customer service representatives 43-4051  other business, professional and technical services
5260 File Clerks 43-4071  other business, professional and technical services
5310 Interviewers, except eligibility and loan 43-4111 other business, professional and technical services
5350 Order clerks 43-4151  other business, professional and technical services
5400 Receptionists and information clerks 43-4171  other business, professional and technical services
5410 Reservation and transportation ticket agents and travel clerks 43-4181  other business, professional and technical services
5420 Information and record clerks, all other 43-4199  other business, professional and technical services
5600 Production, planning, and expediting clerks 43-5061  other business, professional and technical services
5700 Secretaries and administrative assistants 43-6010  other business, professional and technical services
5820 Word processors and typists 43-9022  other business, professional and technical services
1320 Aerospace engineers 17-2011  research, development and testing services
1330 Agricultural engineers 17-2021 research, development and testing services
1440 Marine engineers and naval architects 17-2121  research, development and testing services
1450 Materials engineers 17-2131  research, development and testing services
1600 Agricultural and food scientists 19-1010 research, development and testing services
1610 Biological scientists 19-1020  research, development and testing services
1640 Conservation scientists and foresters 19-1030  research, development and testing services
1720 Chemists and materials scientists 19-2030  research, development and testing services
1740 Environmental scientists and geoscientists 19-2040  research, development and testing services
1760 Physical scientists, all other 19-2099  research, development and testing services
1900 Agricultural and food science technicians 19-4011 research, development and testing services
1910 Biological technicians 19-4021 research, development and testing services
1920 Chemical technicians 19-4031 research, development and testing servicesTable A.4.  Summary Statistics and a Simple Differencing Approach for the Industry-Exposed Sample
Industry-Exposed Sample (N = 24,261)
Industry Switching Change in Unemployment Change in Earnings
Exposed Exposed - Unexposed Exposed Exposed - Unexposed Exposed Exposed - Unexposed
Mean Mean t Mean Mean t Mean Mean t
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1996 0.27 -0.011 -0.91 -0.005 0.000 -0.07 0.054 -0.020 -0.95
1997 0.26 -0.005 -0.43 0.002 0.009 2.58 0.023 -0.065 -2.96
1998 0.28 0.011 0.99 -0.003 0.004 1.38 0.042 -0.087 -4.32
1999 0.30 0.024 2.12 -0.001 0.006 2.06 0.023 -0.034 -1.67
2000 0.28 -0.007 -0.59 -0.002 0.003 1.05 0.018 -0.084 -4.08
2001 0.30 0.022 2.09 0.005 0.007 2.43 0.017 -0.076 -4.19
2002 0.38 0.069 6.43 0.007 0.009 3.21 -0.031 -0.107 -5.74
2003 0.31 0.023 2.18 -0.003 0.003 0.89 -0.018 -0.053 -2.89
2004 0.31 0.030 2.68 -0.002 0.003 0.96 -0.039 -0.082 -4.24
2005 0.31 0.025 2.28 -0.005 0.000 0.04 0.004 -0.047 -2.46
All Years: n-digit industry switching
4-digit 0.30 0.020 5.67
2-digit 0.25 0.020 6.05
1-digit 0.23 0.022 6.89
Notes:  This table is the industry-exposed counterpart to table 2.  The table is identical in structure to table 2 so see the table 2 notes.Table A.5.  Sample Statistics
Industry-Exposed Sample Occupation-Exposed Sample
(N = 24,261) (N = 37,550)
Mean Std. Dev. Difference Mean Std. Dev. Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry Switch
4-digit industry switch 0.30 0.46 0.020 *
2-digit industry switch 0.25 0.43 0.020 *
1-digit industry switch 0.23 0.42 0.022 *
Occupation Switch
4-digit occupation switch 0.31 0.46 0.009 *
2-digit occupation switch 0.20 0.40 -0.020 *
1-digit occupation switch 0.17 0.38 -0.021 *
Employment and Earnings
change in unemployment 0.00 0.11 0.004 * 0.00 0.11 0.002
log annual earnings 10.39 0.90 0.619 * 10.23 0.87 0.310 *
change in annual earnings 0.01 0.74 -0.066 * 0.02 0.70 -0.040 *
experience 20.04 10.83 -0.449 * 20.79 11.00 0.289 *
Education
schooling 14.48 2.20 0.940 * 14.14 2.06 0.461 *
high-school dropout 0.02 0.14 -0.081 * 0.02 0.13 -0.066 *
high-school graduate 0.22 0.42 -0.072 * 0.26 0.44 -0.027 *
college dropout 0.20 0.40 0.005 0.22 0.42 0.018 *
college graduate 0.56 0.50 0.147 * 0.50 0.50 0.075 *
Skills
skilled white-collar 0.57 0.49 0.138 * 0.50 0.50 0.057 *
less-skilled white-collar 0.38 0.48 -0.105 * 0.50 0.50 -0.057 *
skilled blue-collar 0.03 0.17 -0.002 0.00 0.00 0.000
unskilled blue-collar 0.02 0.15 -0.031 * 0.00 0.00 0.000
Other Demographics
married 0.68 0.47 0.084 * 0.68 0.47 0.066 *
male 0.46 0.50 0.105 * 0.38 0.48 -0.072 *
white 0.88 0.32 0.033 * 0.88 0.32 0.014 *
veteran 0.09 0.28 0.025 * 0.07 0.26 -0.009 *
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report means and standard deviations for the industry-exposed sample. Column 3 is the difference
between private service workers aged 18-64 in exposed less unexposed industries. See section 4 for a discussion. An asterisk
(*) indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Columns 4-6 are the corresponding statistics for the
occupation-exposed sample.Table A.6.  Worker Characteristic Coefficients






























2 0.000074 -0.0013 0.000045 -0.0011
(3.86) (-4.62) (4.26) (-15.85)
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the worker characteristic controls. Columns 1 and 4 go with columns 1 and 2 of table 3,
respectively. Columns 2 and 5 go with columns 1 and 2 of table 5, respectively. Columns 3 and 6 go with columns 1 and 2 of table 6,
respectively. Columns 1 and 4 report marginal probabilities while the remaining columns report OLS coefficients. t-statistics are








(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(M
CI/M
G8) 0.92 0.32 0.77 0.08
(10.38) (6.92) (11.03) (1.09)
ln(X
CI/X
G8) -0.28 0.82 0.03 0.85
(-3.90) (8.57) (0.26) (7.64)
R
2  0.87 0.80 0.87 0.74
N 24,261 24,261 37,550 37,550
Notes: This table reports the first-stage results for the IV estimates presented in table 4. t
statistics are in parentheses and are clustered at the industry level (for the industry sample)
or the occupation level (for the occupation sample). All the explanatory variables in the
second stage are also included in the first stage, but are not reported here.Table A.8.  Switchers: Receiving Industry and Change in Annual Earnings
Industry-Exposed Sample











Switchers 16903 2472 2115 1021 869 881
(%) (70%) (10%) (9%) (4%) (4%) (3%)
Change in 
Annual Earnings 3% 1% -11% -15% 1% 0%
Occupation-Exposed Sample







Switchers 26022 5459 5,082 346 641
(%) (69%) (15%) (14%) (1%) (1%)
Change in 
Annual Earnings 3% 4% -7% -10% 0%Figure A.1.  Inshoring and Offshore Outsourcing Plotted Againt ICT
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(coef = 0.03, t-stat = 0.69)